

# Corruption and Cooptation in Autocracy: Evidence from Russia

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## Abstract

Do corrupt officials govern differently in elected office? This paper develops a theoretical framework and analyzes new data from financial disclosures to estimate the governing costs of corruption. First, I uncover substantial hidden wealth held by roughly one-quarter of the legislators in the Russian Duma; these ‘kompromat deputies’ are vulnerable to damaging information being used against them by the regime. Analyzing their behavior in office, I find that these deputies are less active and more absent members of parliament. When called to vote, kompromat deputies from the opposition also more fervently support the regime’s political agenda. Finally, kompromat deputies are less likely to win re-election, suggesting they have shorter time horizons in office as well as that parties have incentives to rotate them out. Autocrats permit and then monitor corruption in order to co-opt potential challengers, who in turn trade loyalty to the regime in exchange for opportunities to self-enrich.

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# 1 Introduction

Thanks to investigative journalists, it is increasingly hard to deny that corruption abounds in many autocratic regimes. Explosive reports have uncovered nondemocratic leaders owning private jets, enormous foreign bank accounts, and palaces in many of the world's most luxurious destinations. Academic work exploiting micro-level data has helped fill out the picture, tracing how elites build illicit fortunes, such as by taking bribes (McMillan and Zoido, 2004), helping companies evade regulation (Rijkers, Baghdadi, and Raballand, 2017), and profiting from state contracts (Mironov and Zhuravskaya, 2016). Yet beyond helping themselves financially, we know little about how opportunities to engage in corruption affect how elected officials carry out the remainder of their official responsibilities. Do corrupt leaders govern differently?

This paper develops a simple theoretical framework and exploits new micro-level evidence from a prominent electoral autocracy – Russia – to help shed light on this question. The focus is on legislators, who not only have relatively well-defined, measurable responsibilities, but through their positions also regularly express political preferences, including potential opposition to the regime. First, I argue that the desire to abuse public office for private gain leads elected officials to shirk their responsibilities, devoting more time to making money from their positions than showing up for votes and sponsoring bills. Next, deputies focused on self-enrichment often generate a stockpile of compromising information (or 'kompromat') that regimes can use against them lest they fall out of line politically. Voting more often with regime priorities helps provide cover for opposition deputies to abuse their office for financial gain. Finally, I argue that corrupt officials have shorter careers in legislative office. On the supply side, parties are concerned about the reputational risk of their corrupt members staying too long in office, while the risk of being caught stealing shortens deputies' time horizons. Rotating out deputies and sharing corruption opportunities across a broader swath of the elite helps ensure party viability over the long term.

To test these arguments, I analyze data on all 1,034 parliamentary deputies working in Russia's parliament, the State Duma, from 2010-2021. To measure individual deputies' hidden wealth, I use information from annual financial disclosures, which provide surprising detail about the income, real estate, and transportation of these elected officials. Applying techniques from investigative journalism and forensic economics (Braguinsky, Mityakov, and Liscovich, 2014), I identify

deputies that either failed to disclose income or assets by cross-referencing their disclosures with new datasets on luxury car ownership and usage. Overall, 22% of deputies during the period had either hidden income or assets. I term this subset 'kompromat deputies', building on the idea that by lying on their financial disclosures, these deputies are not only very corrupt, but also compromised politically and distinctly vulnerable to investigations into their corruption.

My analysis uncovers three main findings. First, the measure of kompromat correlates with greater shirking of deputy responsibilities. Kompromat deputies are less likely to show up to roll call votes, propose legislation and ask questions during parliamentary debates. Personal enrichment comes at the expense of their normal governing responsibilities.

Second, I find that kompromat deputies display stronger loyalty to the regime, even controlling for party affiliation. Loyalty here is measured by the frequency by which deputies support bills initiated by the government as well as ideal point analysis. Importantly the correlation between being compromised and regime loyalty is strongest for members of the systemic opposition, a designation given to three parties formally outside the regime. These findings reveal a mechanism regimes use to co-opt their rivals: opposition deputies exchange self-enrichment opportunities for regime support. The regime looks the other way on their personal corruption so long as they support its legislative priorities. Analyzing potential mechanisms, I find that kompromat deputies are much more likely to lobby on behalf of the security services, rather than corporate interests, suggesting that they are trading political favors for political cover.

Finally, I analyze how engaging in politically compromising corruption affects the career trajectories of deputies. Kompromat deputies are roughly 20% more likely to leave office after a single convocation, and both the ruling party and the opposition see greater turnover among this group of deputies. Rather than uncovering evidence of electoral accountability or punishment by law enforcement, the results instead demonstrate how both parties and politicians face incentives to accelerate the revolving door in and out of autocratic institutions.

This paper makes several contributions to our understanding of how corruption operates in nondemocracies. First, it is among the first papers to calculate the governance costs of allowing elites to pursue self-enrichment at high levels. Previous work has uncovered the rich payoffs political elites can reap from joining authoritarian institutions, as well as some of corruption's aggregate economic consequences (Ferraz, Finan, and Moreira, 2012; Olken, 2007). This paper goes

further by showing how an interest in corruption changes legislative and voting behavior, adding to work how the exploitation of political office can hamper government functionality (Weaver, 2021).

It also provides new micro-level evidence of co-optation under autocracy, showing how members of the opposition trade personal gain for loyalty to the regime (Reuter and Robertson, 2015; Kavasoglu, 2022) and ruling parties use compromising material to maintain elite cohesion (Hollyer and Wantchekon, 2015; De Mesquita et al., 2005; Boix and Svolik, 2013). Attempts to weed out corruption may threaten a leader's support base as well as breathe new life into formerly compliant political institutions. Relatedly, it joins an emerging body of scholarship on how autocratic legislatures work (Gandhi, Noble, and Svolik, 2020), in particular work showing how outside interests affect voting in the Russian Duma (Dasanaik, 2022; Chaisty, 2013). The results here echo previous work showing how transparency in authoritarian regimes can lead deputies to reduce their participation and become more vulnerable to punishment from above (Malesky, Schuler, and Tran, 2012). By demonstrating that political elites under autocracy are concerned with their reputations and accusations of corruption, it also relates to recent work on informational autocrats (Guriev and Treisman, 2019).

The paper finally extends the wealth of studies that use the financial disclosures of public officials to track self-enrichment in office.<sup>1</sup> Disclosures are the among the most common anti-corruption reforms worldwide (Djankov et al., 2010), but because officials self-report their wealth, they can still hide or underreport the fruits of their illicit activities. Therefore, relying exclusively on self-reported financial disclosures creates a number of empirical challenges that could bias the measurement of corruption. By applying methods for uncovering hidden earnings as well as validating disclosures against external datasets, this paper contributes to the arsenal of forensic economics tools that are critical to identifying the incidence of corruption in hard-to-study political settings (Sequeira, 2012; Zitzewitz, 2012). As the Russian case shows, scholars should must pay attention to both official and unofficial income earned while in office to understand how corruption operates.

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<sup>1</sup>Appendix Table A1 shows how commonly self-reported financial disclosures are used as a primary data source in recent work on self-enrichment in public office around the world.

## 2 Corruption in Autocratic Legislatures

To explore how corrupt officials might govern differently, I narrow the focus here to the legislative branch. In contrast to elected bureaucrats, legislators are more likely to enjoy the autonomy to express a wider range of political views and behavior. The nature of their public, individual-level responsibilities allows us to observe not only how they perform their jobs but also how corruption shapes their relations with the broader autocratic regime. Legislators also have ample opportunities to self-enrich while in office. For example, deputies can sell political favors to interest groups and wealthy individuals (Weschle, 2022), often in the form of sponsored legislation. In Russia, this selling of access mainly takes the form of special ‘deputy requests’ that can be used to order bureaucrats to investigate and pressure rival economic interests. Other legislators may exploit their political independence to extract spoils from the incumbent government (Reuter and Robertson, 2015). Co-opting the opposition is thought to be a hallmark of many competitive authoritarian regimes, with the incumbent government organizing lucrative payouts for legislators outside the ruling party in return for their support for the regime. Finally, some legislators may take advantage of their rulemaking powers to pad their own pocketbooks without making agreements with third parties; such as by passing rules to help connected companies, securing employment for family members, or exploiting access to privileged information, key ministers, and government contracts (Blaydes, 2011).

First, I argue that the concerted pursuit of personal financial interests distracts many legislators from their official duties. In other words, corruption leads to shirking. Catering to interest groups can require extensive negotiating and bargaining outside of the physical legislative institutions in order not to arouse suspicions. Legislators pushing their own businesses’ interests may also still have one foot firmly in the private sector and allocate a smaller percentage of their already scarce time and resources to their political responsibilities. Work on the EU, for example, finds that moonlighting politicians, e.g. those that work outside jobs, exert less effort on their official duties (Arnold, Kauder, and Potrafke, 2014; Staat and Kuehnhan, 2017). The returns to corruption may be considerably higher than those offered by outside positions, further pulling legislators from their political duties. This results in greater absenteeism and less time devoted to legislating.

**Hypothesis 1.** *Corrupt legislators will miss more votes, propose fewer bills, and participate less actively*

*in parliamentary discussions.*

Autocratic regimes regularly punish dissent among elites, especially those in top political institutions. Challengers are repressed and officials that dare criticize the regime often meet at best early exits from office and at worst criminal charges. Several recent anti-corruption reforms are suspected of providing cover for regime efforts to enforce strict loyalty among elites. For example, in China, the so-called ‘Tiger and Flies’ anti-corruption campaign have allowed the Communist Party to weaponize corruption charges and purge certain factions (Lorentzen and Lu, 2018). Similarly in the wake of the 2011-2012 anti-regime protests in Russia, opposition-oriented Duma deputies came under political pressure from the Kremlin. In the most striking case, opposition leader Gennady Gudkov lost his legislative seat in 2012 on accusations of continuing to work in the private sector while in office, an illegal practice that is widely ignored for members of the ruling party.<sup>2</sup>

Politicians determined to exploit their positions for personal gain face a trade-off: the more corrupt they become, the more risky it is to oppose the regime. Working outside the regime’s red lines opens up deputies to criminal prosecution, which otherwise might be overlooked if they professed sufficient loyalty. This trade-off lies at the heart of the *kompromat* strategy for managing elite defections (Darden, 2008). Regimes investigate, monitor, and sanction corrupt acts committed by elites, using compromising information to threaten those that step out of line politically. In Russia, the government has targeted surveillance systems to monitor elite loyalty. Opposition members interested in politics solely for personal financial gain may ideologically converge towards their ruling party counterparts in order to avoid the wrath of the regime.

**Hypothesis 2.** *Corrupt legislators ceteris paribus will be more likely to vote with regime priorities.*

It is important to distinguish corrupt legislators from other legislators who directly represent special interests, such as corporations, while in office. In Russia, this latter group has received considerable scholarly attention; for example, Dasanaïke (2022) and Noble (2020) show that deputies with business experience more often defect from their parties. Chaisty (2013) also finds deputies with ties to specific industries introduce more legislation related to these sectors that they might

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<sup>2</sup>The Economist “Why Gennady Gudkov was expelled from the Duma” September 17, 2012.

personally benefit from. Yet corrupt deputies differ in the way they violate established laws in order to self-enrich. Whereas informal lobbying of business interests in Russia is an open secret and often times promoted by the regime, corrupt deputies sell access to politics and therefore must hide their connections and illicit activities. As the results show below, these deputies also transact with interest groups besides large corporations. This illegality creates more significant legal liabilities that shapes their legislative behavior.<sup>3</sup>

Finally, these risks involved in selling political access to outside interests result in corrupt legislators leading shorter careers in elected office. The first reason relates to the problems deputies face in convincing parties to maintain their endorsement and affiliation. As gatekeepers to the ballot, parties fear the reputational costs of embarrassing corruption scandals, such as deputies being exposed living luxurious lifestyles or auctioning off political favors to the highest bidder. Indeed in other settings, there is evidence that corrupt legislators are more likely to see their careers stalled by party elites who block their upward trajectory (Paschall, Sulkin, and Bernhard, 2020). Ambitious legislators are wise to keep their corrupt behavior better hidden in order to advance their careers. Although corruption obviously exists at the highest ranks of autocratic regimes, we should expect corruption investigations to hinder rather than accelerate career advancement.

At the same time, corrupt politicians themselves may have shorter time horizons. As argued above, partaking in egregious self-enrichment creates its own set of legal and reputational risks for the individuals involved. Corrupt elites must be mindful that their political behavior sufficiently compensates for their rent-seeking behavior. The intense scrutiny of top politicians thus creates incentives for maximizing enrichment over a shorter term in office, before leaving for safer pastures farther from the eye of law enforcement, the media, and the general public. Legislators, in particular in federal systems, may not see re-election as of primary importance, as subnational office or other posts within the executive branch offer similar opportunities to make money based on previous parliamentary experience (Samuels, 2003).

**Hypothesis 3.** *Corrupt legislators ceteris paribus will be less likely to remain in elected office.*

The result is a type of revolving door under autocracy. The costs of engaging in overt cor-

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<sup>3</sup>To distinguish this illegal activity from business lobbying, I control for whether deputies had either private sector experience or significant business interests in all models.

ruption generate rotation in and out of office, as parties want to reduce reputational damage and elites face a trade-off between the financial opportunities of higher office and the scrutiny that accompanies it. This turnover occurs, however, without real accountability, as few elites at the top face actual punishment for their self-enrichment.

### 3 Data and Methods

To test whether corrupt legislators govern differently, I examine the case of the Russian Duma, a multiparty, competitive authoritarian parliament with 450 members elected to roughly five year terms. I collect data on all 1,034 deputies over three convocations (2007-2021). Background data on each individual comes from official biographies and the Central Election Commission.

During this period, four parties achieved representation in the Duma, including the ruling party United Russia (UR), and three opposition parties: the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF), the Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR), and Just Russia (SR). Even as President Putin has concentrated power in the executive, the Duma still serves as an “elite battleground” for both party and special interests to bargain, negotiate, and compete for policymaking influence (Noble and Schulmann, 2018). A substantial proportion of bills are amended during the legislative process, even those proposed by ministries (Krol, 2021). In that respect, Russia closely resembles a number of other authoritarian states where special interests mobilize and lobby for policy change (Grömping and Teets, 2023).

However, there are no official laws regulating lobbying, and much of the influence channels operate discretely. A recent civil society report suggests that covert lobbying expenditures in the Duma surpassed \$363.4 million in 2010, with the cost of ensuring the passage of a contested law exceeding \$1 million (Basmanova, Berezovskaya, and Tel’nova, 2019). Special interests also purchase hundreds of ‘deputy requests’ a year, a powerful tool whereby deputies can direct the activities of bureaucrats. Even though deputies in Russia are formally banned from earning outside income, a host of corruption scandals suggests that these access-selling activities can make a deputy seat very lucrative.<sup>4</sup> Parliament holds such a financial payoff that candidates have been caught

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<sup>4</sup>Interfax. “State Duma deputy Vadim Belousov was detained for a bribe of three billion rubles” March 15, 2019. Earle, Jonathan “Ethics Chief Asks for Timeout After ‘Exposure’” *Moscow Times*,

spending millions of dollars in order to secure spots on party lists in advance of elections.<sup>5</sup>

### 3.1 Detecting Corruption using Financial Disclosures

Under an anti-corruption campaign begun in 2008, the Russian government requires that top officials file extensive financial disclosures each spring. Both elected and appointed officials must declare all income, expenditures, bank accounts, company shares, real properties, liabilities and transportation assets for themselves and their immediate family members (spouses and dependent children). As Appendix Table A2 shows, most of this information is classified based on privacy grounds, available only to law enforcement authorities working to combat corruption. But later amendments have required that a small part of every official's disclosure be released to the general public online (see Appendix Table A3). Officials who do not comply with the disclosure rules face a number of sanctions, from removal from office up to criminal prosecution. An example disclosure in original Russian and translated into English can be found in Appendix Figures A1 and A2.

In cooperation with Transparency International-Russia's (TI-R) Declarator project, I collected all available annual disclosures for Duma deputies.<sup>6</sup> Most deputies only began filing disclosures in 2010, which I use as the starting year for the sample, up until 2021, the last year of the 7th convocation. Based on each document, I tabulated reported income, the number of real estate assets, and the make and model of all cars for both the deputy and their family members. Deputies are generally compliant with disclosure rules. Of the 5,752 deputy-years in the dataset (deputies enter the dataset each year they were present for at least one vote), disclosures were filed in 4,646 (81%). The main exception were lame duck deputies failing to file in the last year in office.

Based on their disclosures, deputies in Russia are very wealthy. The median deputy earned roughly \$103,000 per year (at an exchange rate of 50 rubles to the US dollar), roughly six times the average salary of \$18,000 for residents of Moscow. Russia's parliament has historically been a haven for the rich and famous, boasting elite athletes, movie stars, musicians and some of the

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February 14, 2013.

<sup>5</sup>BBC Monitoring. "Independent Russian MPs allege sale of State Duma seats". July 6, 2007.

<sup>6</sup>Since 2011, the 'Declarator' project has gathered all disclosures at [www.declarator.org](http://www.declarator.org).

country's biggest businesspeople (Chaisty, 2013). Appendix Figure A3 plots reported income aggregated to the deputy household level (i.e. including spouses and dependent children) over time, with separate lines for each political party.

I create two red flags for identifying corrupt deputies using the disclosure data. Although some deputies may not be telling the truth when filling out their forms, these lapses in accuracy hold real value for investigators trying to identify evidence of corruption. Omissions and inaccuracies on disclosure forms have become a critical anti-corruption tool for law enforcement and journalists around the world, even by Russian oversight agencies.<sup>7</sup> Indeed, deputies who lie on their forms may be not only be hiding illicit activity, but they be the ones most concerned about their corrupt behavior being exposed. But uncovering false or incomplete information in the disclosures requires cross-referencing them with external assets registries, a difficult task in most settings but one that is possible in Russia.

The first red flag captures whether a deputy failed to disclose any luxury cars owned or driven. I focus on cars for both practical and theoretical reasons. First, cars are the only asset class where such external registries are available to the public; contemporary data on income and real estate assets held by Russians are not available at scale to researchers. Rather, information on car ownership is available from the Russian Union of Auto Insurers (RCA) which hosts a online portal for identifying who owns any car in Russia based on its 17 digit vehicle registration number.<sup>8</sup> Using this portal, I built a panel dataset of the individual owners and drivers (and their birthdates) of 2,742,113 luxury cars in Russia from 2011-2019. However, because querying this database comes at considerable cost, I had to narrow the collection to the top 19 luxury car brands under the assumption that deputies who hide expensive cars are more likely to be earning illicit income through their position.<sup>9</sup> Since most deputies spend the majority of their time in Moscow, I then supple-

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<sup>7</sup>Nina Astafyeva, "Kak prokuratura proveryaet dokhody gosudarstvennykh sluzhashikh," *Online812* (February 8, 2011).

<sup>8</sup>The portal exists to allow drivers and law enforcement to verify insurance records in cases of accidents or other disputes. Stepanov, Dmitriy. 'V Rossii zarabotala infosistyema avtostrahovshshikov, pyeryepisannaya za 2 milliarda «s noolya»' *cnews.ru*, June 29, 2020

<sup>9</sup>Brands were selected using a list from the Russian Ministry of Industry and Trade used to levy

ment the insurance data with leaked registration data from the Moscow and Moscow Oblast Traffic Agencies (GIBDD), which cover 2010-2021. The GIBDD registry has been used extensively by economists to track hidden earnings, tax evasion, and traffic violations (Braguinsky, Mityakov, and Liscovich, 2014; Braguinsky and Mityakov, 2015; Mironov, 2015) and is freely available online. More information on how this measure was created is found in Appendix Section B.

Of the 1,034 deputies in the dataset, 28 (3%) owned 38 luxury cars that did not appear in their disclosures. The relatively small number of deputies hiding these luxury assets suggests they are aware of the relative ease of authorities verifying their car ownership.<sup>10</sup> Note the insurance data allows me to measure missing cars both owned and driven by deputies (for example, those leased or registered in a relative or chauffeur's name), giving a more complete picture of driving activity.<sup>11</sup>

The second red flag captures whether a deputy failed to disclose any income. Registration requirements make cars harder to hide, and Duma deputies may believe that they can more easily shield income from law enforcement authorities (for example, through undeclared or offshore bank accounts). Building off of Braguinsky, Mityakov, and Liscovich (2014), this red flag uncovers hidden wealth by calculating the ratio between the value of cars driven and a deputy's officially reported income. Deputies may be openly driving cars that on paper they are unable to afford. Anti-corruption activists in Russia have used this innovative approach to great success. In 2018, Alexey Navalny's Anti-Corruption Foundation revealed that Duma deputy Leonid Slutsky drove two Bentleys and a Mercedes-Benz) on an official annual income of roughly \$30,000.<sup>12</sup> Deputies who own luxury cars whose value far exceeds their official income may be attempting to hide bribes or illegal side payments.

To calculate the ratio between income and car values, I first assigned make and models to every  

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a tax on vehicles costing more than 3 million rubles.

<sup>10</sup>In other samples of lower-level Russian officials where there is less scrutiny and attention paid to their disclosures, far greater numbers fail to report luxury vehicles.

<sup>11</sup>In 7.5% of the records, the two are different people. This approach cannot locate cars that are registered to legal entities owned by deputies, or owned by their relatives.

<sup>12</sup>Navalny, Alexei "8 marta. V znak solidarnosti vygonjaem iz Gosdumy domogajushhegosja deputata. Psihopata. Korrupcionera" <https://navalny.com>, March 8, 2018.

car owned by a deputy and their family members. I then scraped the for-sale listings on the website of Russia's largest automobile marketplace (<http://www.auto.ru>) several times from May to August 2021.<sup>13</sup> Applying the new car premium and depreciation table calculated by [Braguinsky, Mityakov, and Liscovich \(2014\)](#), I backed out the value of each car at the time it appeared in a deputy's disclosure.<sup>14</sup> To give an example, the mean price of a 2012 Honda Civic for sale in 2021 was 827,500 rubles (roughly \$12,000). For a deputy who owned that car in 2015, its value would be set at 1,507,803 rubles, or roughly \$21,500. Appendix Table B1 lists the 15 most common car makes owned by deputies, as well as the average imputed value in rubles and dollars at the time they appeared on a disclosure. Cars are a commonly held asset class and status symbol, with deputies on average owning worth approximately \$83,000 of vehicles per year.

The measure of hidden earnings is the ratio of the imputed market value of all the cars disclosed by the deputy and family divided by the sum of all family income that year. Overall, 207 deputies (20%) and their families drove cars that on average were worth more than their entire family's annual income. I dichotomize this ratio in order to combine it with the first red flag for a more complete measure of corruption; Appendix Table D2 shows robustness checks using just the continuous ratio. I also include as a control an indicator for the eight deputies that had taken out a loan to purchase their vehicle; this measure is described in more detail in Appendix Section B. Not only are loans rarely among their wealthy subpopulation, the ratio threshold I use above narrows the focus to deputies that would struggle to pay off loans using their official income. Thus I interpret this red flag as capturing deputies living far beyond their officially declared means, not by access to finance but instead to illicit income.

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<sup>13</sup>Over 700,000 vehicles were listed for sale, with roughly 44 cars from each make-model-year combination (for example, there were 92 2012 Honda Civics for sale that summer).

<sup>14</sup>[Braguinsky, Mityakov, and Liscovich \(2014\)](#) use a depreciation rate of 12%, while [auto.ru](#) cites a rate of 10.1%. The results are robust to using depreciation rates of 5% and 10%.

### 3.2 Assessing the Measure of Corruption

In all, 229 deputies, or 22%, failed to disclose a luxury car or had an average hidden earnings ratio of above one during their time in office. I term this subset 'kompromat deputies'.<sup>15</sup> This approach primarily identifies deputies that are highly corrupt, with tens of thousands of dollars missing from disclosures. But the measure also captures more visibly corrupt behavior, and in particular, deputies who are especially vulnerable to investigation by law enforcement and journalists. Duma deputies are high-profile figures whose disclosures attract significant attention. In hiding their corruption in plain sight, kompromat deputies are compromised by their disclosures and may alter their legislative behavior.<sup>16</sup>

The comparison group in this case (the non-kompromat deputies) may still be corrupt, but their corruption is less observable, in particular to law enforcement. Deputies without kompromat, for example, may understand how to use proxies or stash money offshore to prevent discrepancies from being easily caught.<sup>17</sup> The key actor in uncovering the corruption are anti-corruption officials tasked by the regime to verify the disclosures and hold officials accountable. Often the past decade, the Kremlin has used increasingly sophisticated methods to validate the information in disclosures against external officials registries of real estate, transportation, and banking assets that are not available to the general public (I use the insurance data as a work-around for this data missingness).<sup>18</sup> Indeed, each year tens of thousands of violations are uncovered ([General](#),

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<sup>15</sup>Six deputies had both hidden cars and earnings; the results are robust to using an index.

<sup>16</sup>It is not that kompromat deputies are incompetent at engaging in corruption; indeed, they derive massive wealth from political office. But their methods of deploying that wealth make it easier for outsiders to detect. Even the most powerful officials in Russia have at times made curious consumption decisions that allow investigators to uncover their graft. The kompromat measure is capturing the political vulnerabilities that such corruption creates.

<sup>17</sup>Using sophisticated methods to launder money abroad is not necessarily more time-consuming. The global enabler industry has evolved to simplify these steps for those who know how to access it. If offshore tactics were indeed more resource-intensive, this should bias against finding a correlation between kompromat deputies and shirking behavior.

<sup>18</sup>As Appendix Table A4 shows, these reforms have culminated in the creation of the "Poseidon"

2018). Yet the art of money laundering has evolved to such an extent that it is unclear if any law enforcement or financial intelligence unit (FIU) has the capacity to fully know where Russian officials hide their money abroad.<sup>19</sup> It is hard to argue that Russian law officials could do ten years ago what Western investigators are currently struggling with. Moreover, the broader point in the paper is that kompromat deputies who purchase domestic luxury assets beyond their means are easier to catch, monitor and control than those that stash their assets abroad.

Table 1 presents some basic summary statistics about the incidence of kompromat deputies. The party LDPR contains the largest percentage, with roughly 38% of all deputies labelled as compromised. This aligns with anecdotal evidence of the LDPR getting caught selling seats to the highest bidder. Indeed, if this kompromat measure was just picking up consumption preferences, we should expect to see no variation between political parties, which self-organize around ideology, personal ties, and other shared objectives. There also seems to be a decrease in the ratio in more recent convocations. Indeed in response to public criticism of the Duma, speaker Vyacheslav Volodin imposed greater discipline on deputies during the most recent 7th convocation (Noble and Chaisty, 2022).

I show three additional validation checks in Table 1. First, deputies who have been caught plagiarizing their dissertations (see Abalkina and Libman (2020)) are far more likely to be flagged as being compromised. This suggests that the indicator is capturing dishonesty. Second, I break out the percentage of kompromat deputies based on the level of corruption in the region each deputy listed as their place of residence. Data comes from a 2010 expert survey conducted by the Carnegie Moscow Center; I code low, medium and high regions based on their values on this five-point scale. Kompromat deputies more often reside in regions labelled by experts as more corrupt. Finally, drawing on the literature on political selection (Besley, Montalvo, and Reynal-

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system which aims at automatic verification to keep tabs on state officials across the country.

<sup>19</sup>Journalists report regularly about assets that sanctioned Russian elites and oligarchs still control abroad, eluding the eye of elite units such as the Russian Elites, Proxies, and Oligarchs (REPO) Task Force set up by the EU, G7, and Australia. Offshore havens have been notoriously obstinate in sharing information, even under considerable Western pressure following Russia's all-out invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

Querol, 2011; Gulzar, 2021), I coded whether deputies graduated from one of Russia’s top ten universities as a proxy for their competence. Forbes Russia’s 2022 ranking was used to select the top universities. Less competent deputies with fewer political skills may both shirk their official responsibilities and get involved in less sophisticated corruption schemes. We see, however, that graduates of Russia’s most prestigious institutions are just as likely to become vulnerable to kompromat.

**TABLE 1: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS**

	Num.	Kompromat (%)
(1) Full Sample	1,414	23.1
<b>By Party</b>		
(2) United Russia	927	22.5
(3) Communists	203	17.2
(4) LDPR	152	36.8
(5) Just Russia	132	19.7
<b>By Convocation</b>		
(6) 5th (2007-2011)	447	31.3
(7) 6th (2011-2016)	497	23.1
(8) 7th (2016-2021)	470	15.1
<b>Dissernet</b>		
(9) Plagiarized	106	24.5
(10) No Plagiarism Found	208	15.4
<b>By Level of Corruption in Region of Residence</b>		
(11) Low	40	5.0
(12) Medium	533	20.8
(13) High	821	25.3
<b>Attended Top 10 University</b>		
(14) No	1,206	23.3
(15) Yes	208	21.6

**Note:** This table calculates the percentage of ‘kompromat deputies’ based on different descriptors. The Dissernet subsetting uses a binary indicator for whether a deputy plagiarized his or her dissertation based on analysis from the Dissernet project (<https://www.dissernet.org/>). Data on region-level corruption comes from the Carnegie Moscow Center. Data on top 10 universities comes from the 2022 Forbes Russia ranking of Russia’s best universities. The top level number for the full sample is slightly larger than that reported in the main text since it measures the percentage of deputy-convocations, rather than the percentage of deputies.

Appendix Tables B2 and B3 show that the differences between kompromat and other deputies are minimal based on demographic characteristics. Women are less likely to report expensive cars than their incomes cannot afford, in line with other recent work finding that female legislators score better on individual corruption measures (Dollar, Fisman, and Gatti, 2001). Appendix Table

E1 show robustness checks subsetting on gender, showing that female kompromat deputies behave similarly to their male counterparts. In addition, kompromat deputies tend to be younger and less likely to work in the health care sector. Finally, these red flags are also not correlated with more traditional measures of corruption derived from disclosures data (Fisman, Schulz, and Vig, 2012). Columns 4-6 of Appendix Table B2 show that there is no correlation between deputies' change on income over their term in office and having kompromat. This suggests that my approach is picking up something different than earning more money in office, which could be explained by many legal activities. Deputies with kompromat are hiding illicitly earned wealth stashed in other asset classes; that obfuscation creates legal vulnerabilities that shape their political behavior.<sup>20</sup>

### 3.3 Measuring Legislative Behavior and Re-Election

Outcome measures on voting, session attendance, and other legislative activity come from the official Duma API (<http://api.duma.gov.ru>). I measure shirking by collecting roll call votes on 10,985 bills from 2010-2021; since bills must pass multiple readings to be sent to the President's desk, this amounts to 31,256 unique voting events with 15,002,510 votes cast.<sup>21</sup> Absenteeism is high in the Russian Duma; collectively, deputies missed 35% of votes.<sup>22</sup> For each deputy, I calculate the percentage of roll call votes missed each convocation.<sup>23</sup>

Next, I create measures capturing how active deputies are during the sessions that they do attend. One of the deputies' primary responsibilities is to introduce legislation. Yet in the Russian Duma, only a small number of deputies take the initiative to sponsor bills. As a result, sponsoring legislation is one of the strongest signs that deputies are taking their jobs seriously. For each convocation, I create a IHS-transformed count of the number of bills deputies acted as the sole

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<sup>20</sup>Appendix Table D3 shows that change in income is not correlated with any of the main outcomes (shirking, regime loyalty or turnover).

<sup>21</sup>I exclude resolutions and votes not concerning bills being passed into law.

<sup>22</sup>Because deputies can have their colleagues illegally vote for them, this measure underestimates actual absenteeism (Shirikov, 2021).

<sup>23</sup>Appendix Table C3 shows the results hold when readings are considered separately.

sponsor.<sup>24</sup> Legislators also participate by asking questions on the Duma floor during debates. I collect data on all 98,079 questions posed by deputies to bill sponsors or invited experts and calculate an IHS-transformed count of those asked by each deputy in each convocation.

To measure regime loyalty, I follow [Shirikov \(2021\)](#) in identifying bills that were initiated by the federal government (ministries, agencies, etc.), noting that these pieces of legislation best reflect the regime's policymaking goals. I create outcomes to reflect the percentage of times a deputy voted for a federal government bill during each of the three readings; values are captured on a 0 to 100 scale. These roll-call measures illustrate the differences between the regime and the systemic opposition. [Table 2](#) presents summary statistics by party, first showing that over the period, the ruling party UR held roughly 70% of Duma seats, with the remainder roughly divided amongst the three systemic opposition parties. All parties rely heavily on businesspeople to fill their ranks, though the Communists, perhaps due to lingering ideology, have far lower numbers. All parties attract celebrities and boast extremely wealthy deputies.

But the parties differ when it comes to politics. Absenteeism is highest among the LDPR, while rare among those affiliated with UR. Deputies from Just Russia proposed the largest number of bills, roughly three times more than both the Communists and United Russia. Finally, the systemic opposition does not unconditionally support legislation sponsored by the regime. Over the period, the Communists sided with the government roughly 82% of the time, matching other work documenting the party's sometimes uncompromising stance towards the authorities ([March, 2012](#)). In contrast, LDPR demonstrates much stronger loyalty, voting for government bills almost as often as United Russia (with its steadfast 99.9% support of government legislation). Finally all parties experience turnover in their ranks, with roughly half of members leaving office at the end of each term.

I next apply roll call scaling methods using the R package *emirt* to calculate deputy ideal points along a pro or anti-regime dimension ([Poole et al., 2008](#); [McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal, 2016](#)). This procedure fits spatial models to uncover patterns in preferences and ideological voting that might otherwise be missed by simply comparing raw votes. The reference point for each convo-

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<sup>24</sup>The inverse hyperbolic sine transformation is defined as  $\log(y + \sqrt{y^2 + 1})$ . For large values of  $y$ , it performs similarly to the logarithmic transformation, but is able to accommodate values of 0.

**TABLE 2: THE REGIME AND OPPOSITION IN THE STATE DUMA**

	Communist Party	LDPR	Just Russia	United Russia
Num. Deputies	118	102	90	671
Seat Share (%)	12.2	10.5	9.3	69.2
Kompromat (%)	17.2	36.8	19.7	22.5
Female (%)	6.4	6.6	18.9	17.4
Business (%)	13.3	41.4	43.9	36.6
Celebrity (%)	6.4	3.9	9.8	7.8
Income, mil. rub	14.2	11.9	12.9	31.7
Absenteeism (%)	25.7	33.6	24.3	4.4
Num. Bills	2.3	5.8	6.2	2
Govt Bills (%)	82.3	96.7	89.5	99.9
Reelected	58.6	46.1	46.2	49.2

**Note:** This table shows summary statistics for the four main political parties in Russia, with United Russia as the ruling party and the other three constituting the systemic opposition.

cation is the leader of the ruling party fraction (Boris Gryzlov, Sergey Naryshkin, or Vyacheslav Volodin). Appendix Figure B3 plots these deputy-convocation ideal points. Parties vary in their discipline, with the Communists (in red) generally enforcing the most anti-regime (pro-UR) stance of the four parties. Interestingly, United Russia does see some variation in discipline within its voting ranks, with some members at times defecting. I control for party membership in all models.

Finally, I coded whether each deputy was re-elected. For the first two convocations, proportional representations and party lists were used to elect deputies, giving political parties control over selection. But in 2016, 50% of the body was elected using single-member districts (SMDs) as candidates competed directly for votes. Overall, roughly 50% of deputies retained their seats in the next convocation.

### 3.4 Empirical Strategy

The unit of analysis in the paper is the deputy-convocation. Empirical models use OLS, include convocation fixed effects, and cluster standard errors at the deputy level.<sup>25</sup> All models also include covariates for each deputy that have been founded to predict political behavior in the Duma, including age (logged), gender, and primary occupation.<sup>26</sup> I extend the coding scheme of Shirikov

<sup>25</sup>Appendix Table D1 shows the results are robust to clustering on party-convocation.

<sup>26</sup>I code previous occupation using registration forms: Blue Collar Worker, Businessperson, Civil Society, Education, Government, Health Care, or Pensioner / Unemployed.

(2021) to code deputies that have significant business interests or are celebrities (famous athletes, performers, etc.). Together with the occupation dummies, these controls help account for potentially different consumption preferences that could be driving the results. I create a binary indicator if a deputy served as a chair of any committee or fraction during his or her term. High-ranking officials in the Russian government often receive a government car and driver at the public's expense. Leaked automobile lists suggests a small number of such officials serve in the Duma. I also include an indicator for whether the deputy was elected on the party list or through a single-member district, and a running count of their years of experience in the State Duma. Finally, I include an indicator for the 14 deputies who died in office.

Identifying the effect of kompromat on deputy behavior requires that several assumptions hold. The first is that corrupt activities occur prior to the three sets of outcomes being studied: shirking, showing loyalty to the regime, and winning re-election. The structure of the data suggests that this assumption is more strongly upheld for the first and third outcomes rather than regime loyalty. To capture corruption, I examine how deputies spend their corrupt earnings rather than how they acquire them, which is impossible because of the nature of the closed-door, illegal dealings. It is then possible that deputies may exhibit loyalty to the regime first, and then be rewarded with side payments or opportunities to earn illicit income. The fact that this reverse relationship is possible does not undermine the central theoretical claims that these deputies are being co-opted by the regime. One of the paper's key aims is to show an exchange of corruption for loyalty, and therefore I am careful not to describe this correlation as causal.

This first assumption however holds more strongly for the shirking and turnover hypotheses. It is much harder to argue that engaging in absenteeism or inactivity are lucrative for deputies, or that outside interests would pay them not to show up for work. Finally, the turnover measures capture end-of-term outcomes which are measured after all disclosures for the previous term have been submitted. We can be more confident that that observed corruption takes place before parties decide on which deputies to retain.

The second identifying assumption is that shirking, loyalty, and turnover are not driven by some unobserved factor that might produce a spurious correlation with the presence of kompromat. This assumption is difficult to directly test, in particular due to the challenge of finding an exogenous instrument for kompromat at the deputy-level. We do not observe enough about the

lives or activities of these individuals to make a strong case of their corruption being predicated on some other pre-existing characteristic. Instead, I show a range of placebo and robustness tests in the Appendix. I also follow the methods proposed by [Altonji, Elder, and Taber \(2005\)](#) and [Oster \(2019\)](#) to investigate whether unobserved variation is likely to be explaining the results. For every model, I report Oster's  $\delta$  statistic, indicating how much more important the unobserved characteristics of the deputies would need to be compared to observables to fully explain the results. All results are also shown with an extended set of political and occupational covariates to isolate the effect of the hidden wealth measure.

## 4 Results

Table 3 presents models examining legislative shirking. First, we see in Columns 1 and 2 that the measure of kompromat is positively associated with absenteeism, as measured by the percentage of roll call votes a deputy missed over a convocation. That effect is a little more than half that of two common types of deputies who miss votes: those representing single-member districts (who may live far from Moscow) and celebrities (who are often used to drive electoral turnout but have little interest in politics). Deputies focusing on making money for themselves show up less often for work and rank among the more absentee members of the institution.

Not only do kompromat deputies miss roll call votes, but they are less involved in the sponsorship of legislation. Columns 3 and 4 show that kompromat deputies propose fewer bills. The right-most columns examine the number of questions asked over the course of a convocation (Columns 5 and 6). Kompromat deputies on average ask 19-25% fewer questions per year, though the results are not as precisely estimated.<sup>27</sup> Taken together, this table provides evidence of shirking among those deputies found using their office for private gain.

The point estimates on several other characteristics of shirking are also worth mentioning. First, deputies with business activities and celebrities are generally much less active in parliament, as measured by their absenteeism, bill-drafting activity, and interest in asking questions. This contrasts with work by [Chaisty \(2013\)](#) who finds that businessperson deputies in earlier convocations

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<sup>27</sup>Appendix Table C2 shows results are statistically significant when a raw count is used instead of an IHS-transformation

TABLE 3: CORRUPTION AND SHIRKING

	Absenteeism (all)		Bills (ihs)		Questions (ihs)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Kompromat Deputy	1.14** (0.462)	1.02** (0.453)	-0.078* (0.044)	-0.078* (0.044)	-0.255* (0.145)	-0.194 (0.138)
Family Real Estate Assets (ihs)	0.582* (0.319)	0.358 (0.332)	-0.015 (0.027)	-0.017 (0.028)	-0.278*** (0.096)	-0.189** (0.095)
Ever Had Car Loan	0.132 (2.00)	0.108 (1.93)	-0.106 (0.097)	-0.107 (0.091)	-0.288 (0.793)	-0.220 (0.735)
Age (log)	0.774 (0.795)	-0.110 (0.908)	-0.135* (0.080)	-0.174** (0.086)	0.403 (0.272)	0.030 (0.255)
Member: United Russia	-2.82*** (0.789)	-2.92*** (0.810)	-0.362*** (0.080)	-0.323*** (0.077)	-0.964*** (0.213)	-0.820*** (0.195)
Member: Communist Party	3.44*** (0.950)	3.29*** (0.979)	-0.175* (0.094)	-0.138 (0.091)	-0.315 (0.281)	-0.287 (0.259)
Member: LDPR	14.6*** (1.19)	14.5*** (1.16)	0.159 (0.132)	0.180 (0.129)	0.079 (0.283)	0.244 (0.265)
Died in Office	9.67*** (3.20)	8.30*** (3.10)	-0.025 (0.113)	-0.034 (0.127)	-1.46*** (0.460)	-0.875** (0.391)
Female	-0.655 (0.441)	-0.559 (0.458)	-0.117*** (0.045)	-0.117** (0.046)	0.434*** (0.139)	0.295** (0.131)
Attended Top University	1.25** (0.582)	1.09* (0.571)	0.078 (0.061)	0.070 (0.061)	0.266 (0.174)	0.210 (0.163)
Committee Leader		-0.704* (0.387)		0.096*** (0.035)		0.763*** (0.103)
Fraction Chair		-2.86*** (0.826)		0.201* (0.109)		1.23*** (0.226)
SMD Deputy		1.02 (0.729)		-0.026 (0.052)		0.192 (0.150)
Years in Office		0.178*** (0.047)		-0.002 (0.004)		-0.0007 (0.014)
Number of Votes (log)		-0.826 (0.962)		0.036 (0.042)		0.884*** (0.110)
Celebrity		1.85** (0.755)		0.034 (0.067)		-0.792*** (0.204)
Significant Business Interests		1.07** (0.462)		0.036 (0.050)		-0.687*** (0.142)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.411	0.433	0.113	0.134	0.092	0.234
Observations	1,414	1,414	1,414	1,414	1,414	1,414
Oster's $\delta$ for $\beta = 0$	5	3.77	-8.56	-8.89	4.78	2.83
Convocation fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Occupation fixed effects		✓		✓		✓

**Note:** \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$  This table shows results using different measures of legislative shirking as the outcome variables. The unit of analysis is the deputy-convocation. Absenteeism is the percentage of all votes a deputy missed during the convocation. Columns 3 and 4 analyze the weighted number of bills initiated by deputy, and Columns 5 and 6 measure the number of questions asked during debates. The reference category for the party member predictors is Just Russia. All models are estimated using OLS with standard errors clustered at the deputy level.

put forth more legislation related to their sector. As the authoritarian regime consolidated under United Russia party in the 2010s, there may be less scope for individual legislative initiative. In these later convocations, these two categories (businesspeople and celebrities) constitute upwards of 40% of the chamber, helping ensure a more docile deputy population that delegates legislative responsibilities to only the most active members: those in leadership positions (committees, fractions, etc.) and women.

Returning to Hypothesis 2, Table 4 examines whether kompromat deputies are more likely to support regime priorities. The first outcomes capture the percentage of the bills initiated by the federal government that each deputy voted for, first aggregated across all readings (Columns 1-2) and then broken out by the three readings (Columns 3-8). Deputies who hide income and assets on their disclosures are much more likely to vote with the regime, even controlling for party membership. These findings also come through in Columns 9 and 10, where the outcome is each deputy's ideal point. Kompromat deputies exhibit more pro-regime voting behavior.<sup>28</sup>

#### 4.1 Corruption and Opposition Behavior

Voting against the regime can mean different things based on a deputy's formal political affiliation. For members of the ruling party, dissenting on a bill might signal discontent with government priorities that could not be resolved behind closed doors, but falls short of defecting from the party (Reuter and Szakonyi, 2019). Ruling parties may also be wary of punishing scandal-ridden members for fear of bad publicity. In the case of United Russia, only two deputies over the past two-plus decades have ever been stripped of their deputy immunity (see Appendix Table A3), with members accused of serious sexual harassment and corrupt activities having kept their seats.

But for members of systemic opposition parties, challenging the regime can carry much greater costs. Opposition deputies that abuse their office for personal gain are much more careful to toe the government line for fear of provoking retribution from the regime. In addition to the case of Gudkov described above, criminal charges have been filed against a handful of opposition deputies for crossing criminal or corrupt red lines, including Ilya Ponomarev (Just Russia), Nikolai

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<sup>28</sup>Appendix Table C4 codes the main issues in each bill initiated by the federal government, finding little difference on bill topic.

**TABLE 4: CORRUPTION AND REGIME LOYALTY**

	Govt Bills (all)		Govt Bills (1st)		Govt Bills (2nd)		Govt Bills (3rd)		Ideal Point	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Kompromat Deputy	0.303*** (0.101)	0.344*** (0.101)	0.405*** (0.151)	0.459*** (0.152)	0.474*** (0.163)	0.525*** (0.164)	0.500*** (0.165)	0.563*** (0.166)	0.105** (0.044)	0.114*** (0.044)
Family Real Estate Assets (ihs)	0.055 (0.066)	0.063 (0.068)	0.160 (0.098)	0.152 (0.101)	0.063 (0.106)	0.070 (0.108)	0.113 (0.112)	0.103 (0.115)	0.006 (0.028)	-0.019 (0.028)
Ever Had Car Loan	-0.679*** (0.095)	-0.833*** (0.122)	-1.06*** (0.143)	-1.31*** (0.189)	-1.29*** (0.179)	-1.50*** (0.218)	-1.23*** (0.172)	-1.49*** (0.222)	-0.138 (0.099)	-0.170* (0.092)
Age (log)	-0.342 (0.223)	-0.217 (0.223)	-0.438 (0.324)	-0.243 (0.322)	-0.458 (0.363)	-0.338 (0.373)	-0.394 (0.374)	-0.120 (0.381)	-0.066 (0.085)	0.095 (0.091)
Member: United Russia	8.57*** (0.160)	8.63*** (0.166)	10.2*** (0.241)	10.3*** (0.243)	10.2*** (0.213)	10.4*** (0.225)	10.9*** (0.243)	11.0*** (0.248)	6.93*** (0.075)	6.91*** (0.076)
Member: Communist Party	-3.97*** (0.277)	-3.96*** (0.274)	-5.22*** (0.411)	-5.16*** (0.401)	-6.60*** (0.429)	-6.58*** (0.426)	-7.17*** (0.461)	-7.10*** (0.454)	-3.70*** (0.106)	-3.67*** (0.106)
Member: LDPR	5.43*** (0.215)	5.33*** (0.211)	7.30*** (0.293)	7.21*** (0.287)	6.61*** (0.278)	6.48*** (0.277)	7.18*** (0.285)	7.05*** (0.279)	1.37*** (0.089)	1.38*** (0.088)
Died in Office	0.833* (0.457)	0.788* (0.449)	1.03* (0.595)	1.09* (0.578)	1.28* (0.709)	1.32* (0.703)	1.12 (0.684)	1.11* (0.664)	0.027 (0.263)	0.182 (0.258)
Female	-0.056 (0.097)	-0.051 (0.102)	-0.142 (0.149)	-0.137 (0.157)	-0.150 (0.164)	-0.143 (0.174)	-0.131 (0.169)	-0.117 (0.179)	0.005 (0.040)	0.011 (0.039)
Attended Top University	-0.042 (0.126)	-0.051 (0.126)	0.043 (0.187)	0.021 (0.188)	0.024 (0.201)	0.007 (0.202)	0.021 (0.207)	0.010 (0.209)	-0.004 (0.049)	0.008 (0.046)
Committee Leader		0.468*** (0.109)		0.693*** (0.162)		0.711*** (0.182)		0.775*** (0.183)		0.091** (0.038)
Fraction Chair		-0.086 (0.228)		-0.080 (0.350)		-0.043 (0.346)		-0.069 (0.358)		-0.087 (0.079)
SMD Deputy		-0.536*** (0.152)		-0.938*** (0.209)		-0.923*** (0.215)		-0.908*** (0.218)		-0.0009 (0.061)
Years in Office		-0.013 (0.012)		-0.019 (0.017)		-0.019 (0.018)		-0.028 (0.019)		-0.016*** (0.004)
Number of Votes (log)		-0.291* (0.174)		-0.041 (0.257)		-0.098 (0.387)		-0.294 (0.304)		0.188 (0.121)
Celebrity		-0.122 (0.162)		-0.140 (0.232)		-0.225 (0.262)		-0.142 (0.263)		0.0004 (0.055)
Significant Business Interests		0.012 (0.098)		0.042 (0.140)		0.020 (0.148)		0.098 (0.152)		0.065* (0.038)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.852	0.855	0.798	0.803	0.783	0.787	0.794	0.798	0.965	0.966
Observations	1,414	1,414	1,413	1,413	1,413	1,413	1,414	1,414	1,414	1,414
Oster's $\delta$ for $\beta = 0$	6.52	8.69	4.5	6.01	6.13	8.15	5.34	7.21	11.71	13.34
Convocation fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Occupation fixed effects		✓		✓		✓		✓		✓

**Note:** \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1 This table shows results using different measures of loyalty to the regime as the outcome variables. The Govt Bills column measure the percentage of government-initiated bills that deputies voted for during the convocation, either altogether (Columns 1-2) or broken out into 1st, 2nd or third readings. Ideal points are calculated for each convocation across all readings using the R package *emirt*. The reference category for the party member predictors is Just Russia. All models are estimated using OLS with standard errors clustered at the deputy level.

Parshin (Communist Party), and Aleksey Mitrofanov (Just Russia).

Table 5 tests whether the correlation between being compromised and regime loyalty differs by party, breaking down the regression models shown in Table 4 into subsets based on United Russia (UR) or systemic opposition parties. Models subset to the opposition include party indicators. Importantly, there are large and statistically significant coefficients on the measure of kompromat across all four outcomes related to regime loyalty, but only for deputies from the systemic opposition. United Russia deputies with hidden income and assets do not appear to change their voting behavior, potentially not fearing that the government will punish them. The Oster sensitivity tests also indicate that it is unlikely that selection on unobservables is driving the results for either ruling party or opposition members.

Party discipline is very strong in the Russian Duma, leaving less variation to be explained by demographic characteristics. For the models subset to UR, we see only that fraction leaders consistently vote more in line with the government, while deputies representing single member districts are more likely to oppose it. However, these coefficients are small, given that ruling party deputies vote with government nearly 100% of the time. This level of conformity suggests a limitation of the paper's ability to detect a relationship between kompromat and loyalty among members of the regime.

However, for members of the systemic opposition, the kompromat measure is among the, if not the strongest, predictor of regime loyalty.<sup>29</sup> Only gender is a more powerful predictor of vote choice after controlling for party. Kompromat deputies (along with women) constitute the most pro-regime faction within the systemic opposition.

Appendix Table E4 analyzes deputy votes on government bills that turned out to be relatively competitive, excluding any votes that received either less than 10% support or more than 90% support from the chamber. This approach involves subsetting based on the outcome variable, so

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<sup>29</sup>Kompromat deputies do not seem to be regime 'plants' or weakly loyal to the opposition. On average, kompromat deputies have run under the same opposition party banner roughly two times before in municipal and regional elections, an identical number as their non-kompromat counterparts. There also is no evidence that kompromat deputies have previously affiliated with the ruling party at higher rates.

should be interpreted with caution. The coefficients on the measure of kompromat are five times larger while remaining statistically significant, but only for deputies from the systemic opposition. Demonstrating loyalty to the regime is only important as an insurance strategy for those formally outside the regime.

Interestingly, I also find no effect of business deputies defecting from the regime, a result that contrasts with previous work by (Dasanaïke, 2022). This could be explained by a difference in my sample, which covers three convocations and all votes, rather than only budget bills in a single convocation. Businesspeople may not behave differently from their peers across a wider range of policy issues. Appendix Table E3 shows that the results are slightly stronger for two of the three convocations (5th and 7th), suggesting that when United Russia turned up the screws on party discipline and regime loyalty in the wake of the 2011-2012 protests, there was less room for kompromat deputies to distinguish themselves. Finally, as a placebo test, I test for party heterogeneity in the shirking results, which should not be affected by opposition deputies trying to curry favor with the regime. Appendix Table C1 subsets finds no differences between the two when it comes to shirking.

## 4.2 Corruption and Mechanisms of Influence

What are deputies doing to earn this illicit income? The Russian Duma has long been a preferred political playground for interest groups to seek influence. Although firms working in natural resources dominate the overall Russian economy, Chaisty (2013) documents widespread interest in Duma representation across firms working in manufacturing, agriculture, construction, finance and trade. Kompromat deputies may be earning side payments in exchange for proposing legislation and amendments, participating in legislative debates and issuing deputy requests.

Yet firms are not the only interest groups investing in political access. During Putin's time in power, individuals connected to the security services – the so-called siloviki – have emerged as a powerful political constituency (Taylor, 2017). Siloviki dominate the private sector, first through raiding against business and more recently through centralizing control over key economic assets (Rochlitz, Kazun, and Yakovlev, 2020). Beyond their formal posts in the executive branch, siloviki exert considerable sway on Duma members to ensure little government oversight of their activities

**TABLE 5: CORRUPTION AND REGIME LOYALTY, SUBSET BY PARTY**

	Govt Bills (all)		Govt Bills (1st)		Govt Bills (2nd)		Govt Bills (3rd)		Ideal Point	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Kompromat Deputy	-0.025 (0.024)	0.684*** (0.217)	-0.042 (0.040)	0.847** (0.334)	-0.015 (0.015)	0.943*** (0.340)	-0.034 (0.026)	1.07*** (0.367)	-0.026 (0.036)	0.242*** (0.088)
Family Real Estate Assets (ihs)	-0.002 (0.009)	0.016 (0.164)	-0.002 (0.013)	0.124 (0.256)	0.001 (0.006)	-0.075 (0.254)	0.002 (0.009)	0.002 (0.295)	0.004 (0.018)	-0.013 (0.065)
Ever Had Car Loan	0.049* (0.029)		0.065* (0.034)		-0.011 (0.018)		0.027 (0.027)		-0.015 (0.051)	
Age (log)	-0.029 (0.023)	0.087 (0.565)	-0.042* (0.023)	0.479 (0.810)	-0.030* (0.017)	0.449 (0.891)	-0.034 (0.022)	0.946 (0.986)	0.012 (0.038)	0.068 (0.212)
Died in Office	-0.040 (0.028)	1.37* (0.700)	0.015 (0.045)	1.47* (0.842)	0.045*** (0.014)	1.85** (0.875)	-0.021 (0.048)	1.45 (0.906)	-0.151* (0.080)	0.905** (0.406)
Female	0.012 (0.011)	0.790** (0.318)	-0.002 (0.013)	0.928* (0.480)	0.002 (0.009)	1.32*** (0.504)	0.017* (0.011)	1.29** (0.553)	0.025 (0.021)	0.249** (0.116)
Attended Top University	-0.024* (0.013)	0.204 (0.226)	-0.022 (0.018)	0.537 (0.331)	-0.012 (0.010)	0.531 (0.339)	-0.020 (0.015)	0.599 (0.372)	-0.009 (0.025)	0.150 (0.092)
Committee Leader	0.011 (0.009)	0.290 (0.236)	0.004 (0.012)	0.400 (0.332)	0.009 (0.007)	0.212 (0.351)	0.009 (0.009)	0.427 (0.361)	0.017 (0.016)	-0.002 (0.089)
Fraction Chair	0.046*** (0.016)	-0.171 (0.341)	0.047* (0.026)	-0.181 (0.552)	0.022 (0.016)	-0.104 (0.504)	0.053*** (0.018)	-0.079 (0.581)	0.108*** (0.031)	-0.102 (0.117)
SMD Deputy	-0.049** (0.024)	-0.463 (0.630)	-0.068* (0.041)	-0.671 (0.774)	-0.030** (0.015)	-0.610 (0.826)	-0.043* (0.026)	-0.770 (0.897)	-0.096*** (0.036)	-0.266 (0.217)
Years in Office	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.008 (0.025)	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.010 (0.033)	-0.002 (0.001)	-0.010 (0.034)	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.026 (0.036)	-0.013*** (0.003)	-0.004 (0.008)
Number of Votes (log)	-0.019 (0.034)	-0.718** (0.330)	-0.035** (0.017)	-0.259 (0.374)	-0.009 (0.014)	-0.411 (0.739)	0.030 (0.039)	-0.952 (0.579)	0.898*** (0.023)	-0.416*** (0.123)
Celebrity	0.020 (0.021)	-0.178 (0.393)	0.038 (0.031)	-0.266 (0.489)	0.013 (0.014)	-0.428 (0.567)	0.019 (0.024)	-0.220 (0.560)	0.013 (0.035)	0.053 (0.131)
Significant Business Interests	0.002 (0.011)	0.220 (0.273)	$8.06 \times 10^{-5}$ (0.017)	0.471 (0.372)	0.012 (0.009)	0.412 (0.375)	0.009 (0.012)	0.617 (0.398)	0.012 (0.018)	0.187* (0.096)
Member: Communist Party		-3.76*** (0.258)		-4.82*** (0.332)		-6.31*** (0.376)		-6.72*** (0.394)		-3.56*** (0.101)
Member: LDPR		5.45*** (0.268)		7.46*** (0.390)		6.76*** (0.395)		7.40*** (0.425)		1.47*** (0.099)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.079	0.825	0.034	0.807	0.029	0.824	0.037	0.808	0.799	0.893
Observations	927	487	927	486	927	486	927	487	927	487
Party Subset	UR	Non-UR	UR	Non-UR	UR	Non-UR	UR	Non-UR	UR	Non-UR
Oster's $\delta$ for $\beta = 0$	5.68	2.07	-10.45	1.79	17.81	2.37	-36.51	2.07	-0.79	1.93
Convocation fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Occupation fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

**Note:** \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1 This table shows results using different measures of loyalty to the regime as the outcome variables, subset by whether the deputy is the member of the ruling party United Russia (odd columns) or a systemic opposition party (even columns). The Govt Bills column measure the percentage of government-initiated bills that deputies voted for during the convocation, either altogether (Columns 1-2) or broken out into 1st, 2nd or third readings. Ideal points are calculated for each convocation across all readings using the R package *emirt*. The reference category for the party member predictors is Just Russia. All models are estimated using OLS with standard errors clustered at the deputy level.

(Soldatov and Rochlitz, 2018). Siloviki interests even extend beyond rent-seeking; from 2017-2019, the Duma increased spending on health care for members of security services by a factor of eleven, as well as added additional privileges, such as early retirement and housing subsidies (Basmanova, Berezovskaya, and Tel'nova, 2019). Kompromat deputies have multiple suitors to sell access to beyond corporate structures.

To test for the sources of external money, I collect data from TI-R's Lobbying in the State Duma project which studied lobbying influence in the 7th convocation (Basmanova, Berezovskaya, and Tel'nova, 2019). Researchers analyzed over 48,000 public documents and financial reports to identify lobbying connections between deputies and interest groups, including corporations, federal ministries, security agencies, regional governments, and non-profits. The result is a dataset of 718 deputy-'interest group' ties for 349 deputies for which such relations were uncovered. I focus the analysis on deputies representing the two main interests above – corporations (53% of lobbying ties) and security services (13% of lobbying ties) – given that they are the two most common relationships.<sup>30</sup> To my knowledge, this dataset is the only one available for tracking connections between deputies and special interests; unfortunately only deputies of the 7th convocation (2016-2021) are included.

Table 6 shows results predicting whether deputies lobby for corporations or the security services. For each outcome, the first column (Columns 1 and 4) shows results for the full sample deputies across all four parties. Kompromat deputies are perhaps slightly less likely to lobby for companies, and slightly more likely to lobby for the security services. However the results are much more pronounced when subset based on regime (Columns 2 and 5) or opposition membership (Columns 3 and 6). Kompromat deputies from the opposition are significantly more likely to push for the interests of the security services; this measure is the second most powerful predictor after having celebrity status. On the other hand, these same deputies are less likely to have developed ties with corporations. Importantly, neither trend holds for deputies from the ruling party.

These results provide additional support for the hypothesis that kompromat deputies trade

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<sup>30</sup>Appendix Table F1 shows no correlation between kompromat deputies and lobbying for regional authorities, other federal agencies, NGOs, churches, and other groups.

**TABLE 6: CORRUPTION AND LOBBYING**

	Lobbies for Corporations			Lobbies for Security Services		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Kompromat Deputy	-0.034 (0.059)	0.041 (0.068)	-0.250** (0.120)	0.100* (0.056)	0.044 (0.062)	0.252** (0.117)
Family Real Estate Assets (ihs)	0.016 (0.033)	0.026 (0.036)	0.038 (0.071)	-0.031 (0.028)	-0.048 (0.031)	0.019 (0.059)
Ever Had Car Loan	-0.223 (0.152)	-0.207 (0.169)		0.290* (0.174)	0.298* (0.172)	
Age (log)	0.116 (0.109)	0.146 (0.129)	0.033 (0.219)	0.047 (0.088)	-0.021 (0.105)	0.122 (0.165)
Member: United Russia	0.165 (0.116)			0.046 (0.072)		
Member: Communist Party	-0.097 (0.131)		-0.059 (0.145)	0.019 (0.089)		0.045 (0.102)
Member: LDPR	-0.052 (0.128)		-0.065 (0.150)	0.005 (0.091)		0.011 (0.092)
Female	-0.102 (0.063)	-0.078 (0.070)	-0.262** (0.129)	-0.059 (0.045)	-0.073 (0.048)	-0.102 (0.104)
Committee Leader	0.052 (0.048)	0.060 (0.057)	0.065 (0.096)	0.036 (0.040)	0.043 (0.049)	0.043 (0.063)
Fraction Chair	-0.007 (0.113)	0.067 (0.185)	-0.004 (0.166)	-0.039 (0.088)	-0.078 (0.156)	-0.009 (0.099)
SMD Deputy	0.047 (0.045)	0.033 (0.051)	0.162 (0.101)	-0.030 (0.036)	-0.044 (0.041)	0.051 (0.097)
Years in Office	0.013*** (0.004)	0.016*** (0.005)	0.008 (0.009)	0.005 (0.004)	0.007* (0.004)	-0.004 (0.007)
Number of Votes (log)	0.508*** (0.073)	0.740*** (0.095)	0.291*** (0.093)	0.190*** (0.037)	0.197*** (0.047)	0.152** (0.065)
Celebrity	0.077 (0.080)	0.084 (0.091)	0.164 (0.162)	0.009 (0.061)	-0.088* (0.053)	0.354** (0.173)
Significant Business Interests	0.161*** (0.051)	0.166*** (0.057)	0.162 (0.122)	0.009 (0.041)	-0.011 (0.046)	0.017 (0.096)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.213	0.210	0.217	0.078	0.089	0.202
Observations	470	354	116	470	354	116
Party Subset	All	UR	Non-UR	All	UR	Non-UR
Oster's $\delta$ for $\beta = 0$	-2.9	2.24	-16.27	8.6	4.66	9.2
Occupation fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

**Note:** \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$  This table examines whether deputies in the 7th convocation were classified by TI-Russia as lobbying for the interests of corporations (Columns 1-3) or the interests of Russian security services (Columns 4-6). For each outcome, results are shown first using all deputies and then broken out by ruling party or systemic opposition. All models are estimated using OLS with standard errors clustered at the deputy level.

loyalty to the regime in return for financial enrichment. It is possible that deputies feel emboldened to skirt anti-corruption laws precisely because of their ties to the security services. However, signing legal affidavits about one's personal wealth produces compromising information that the government could later use to punish deputies who step out of line. These individuals sell their legislative autonomy. The overlap between corruption, the systemic opposition, and the security state may help explain why systemic opposition parties mostly fail to constrain, or even oppose, the regime even though they enjoy formal political power. These parties contain a significant number of individuals who have tied their financial fortunes closely to the state and have less incentive to oppose it.

The ideal way for deputies to profit off their political office is to sell deputy requests. However, the Duma has been loathe to share publicly any data on the requests being issued. Only in January 2021 did the Duma chair encourage deputies to post the requests online, citing the need for public transparency based on the potential for corruption.<sup>31</sup> As of February 2022, only 54 (7.9%) deputies in the 7th convocation (2016-2021) had a page available for citizens to view. Appendix Table F2 shows that kompromat deputies are significantly less likely to have created such webpages to publicly host this request information; in fact, just 2 of these kompromat deputies (out of 71) embraced transparency. Kompromat deputies may be particularly hesitant to allow voters to track their usage of this powerful tool.

### **4.3 Corruption, Career Concerns, and Accountability**

Finally, I test the hypothesis about whether kompromat decreases the chances of deputies holding onto their seats. The models in Table 7 first analyze whether deputies re-ran for office (e.g. were included on a party list or contested a single-member district), and then whether they were re-elected. We see that that deputies hiding income and assets are approximately 9% less likely to run for re-election. Consequently, Columns 3 and 4 show that means that they were 11% less likely to hold onto their seats, a sharp drop considering a baseline rate of 50% re-election rates. This result is roughly the same for ruling party and opposition deputies (see Appendix Table F3).

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<sup>31</sup>Duma.Gov.Ru "Na sayte Gosudarstvennoy Dumy poyavilsya razdel o zaprosakh deputatov", January 27, 2021

**TABLE 7: CORRUPTION AND RE-ELECTION**

	Ran for Re-election		Re-elected	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Kompromat Deputy	-0.094*** (0.031)	-0.082*** (0.030)	-0.109*** (0.036)	-0.110*** (0.032)
Family Real Estate Assets (ihs)	0.026 (0.019)	0.022 (0.019)	0.023 (0.023)	0.013 (0.021)
Ever Had Car Loan	0.081 (0.160)	0.052 (0.154)	0.198 (0.166)	0.176 (0.158)
Age (log)	-0.270*** (0.062)	-0.356*** (0.066)	-0.154** (0.072)	-0.340*** (0.070)
Member: United Russia	-0.254*** (0.037)	-0.048 (0.068)	0.022 (0.051)	0.391*** (0.078)
Member: Communist Party	0.013 (0.041)	-0.015 (0.050)	0.137** (0.059)	0.073 (0.064)
Member: LDPR	-0.106** (0.050)	0.018 (0.065)	-0.024 (0.066)	0.135* (0.069)
Female	-0.015 (0.038)	-0.023 (0.037)	-0.040 (0.041)	-0.040 (0.037)
Committee Leader		0.184*** (0.025)		0.201*** (0.028)
Fraction Chair		0.139*** (0.047)		0.333*** (0.050)
SMD Deputy		-0.034 (0.043)		0.002 (0.046)
Years in Office		0.007** (0.003)		0.013*** (0.003)
Number of Votes (log)		-0.036 (0.030)		-0.044 (0.037)
Celebrity		0.063 (0.048)		0.124** (0.051)
Significant Business Interests		0.046 (0.030)		0.071** (0.032)
Govt Bills (all)		-0.018*** (0.006)		-0.030*** (0.007)
Absenteeism (all)		-0.0007 (0.002)		0.004** (0.002)
Bills (ihs)		-0.006 (0.019)		-0.036 (0.022)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.085	0.149	0.025	0.147
Observations	1,344	1,344	1,344	1,344
Oster's $\delta$ for $\beta = 0$	-14.92	-124.89	-9.15	-24.65
Convocation fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Occupation fixed effects		✓		✓

**Note:** \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1 This table looks at deputy post-convocation career outcomes. Columns 1 and 2 analyze an indicator for whether deputies ran for re-election (either on a party list or in a single-member district). Columns 3 and 4 analyze whether deputies won re-election. All models are estimated using OLS with standard errors clustered at the deputy level.

In the theory section, I argued that both parties and deputies have reasons to embrace turnover. Below I examine the observational implications of several alternate explanations before arguing in favor of this party and candidate-centric claim. First, we might expect voters to be the ones punishing kompromat deputies at the ballot box for shirking their duties and prioritizing self-enrichment (Klašnja, 2015). However Appendix Table F6 shows kompromat deputies faced no such punishment from voters in SMDs during the 2016 parliamentary elections. These deputies are not particularly fearful of electoral accountability.

Next, Russia's anti-corruption campaign may have incentivized law enforcement to go after kompromat deputies in order to improve the regime's image (Carothers, 2022). Accountability then would operate through the judicial system rather than the ballot box. In Appendix Table A3, I collected data on all deputies who had their parliamentary immunity stripped from 2008-2021; this is the first step in a criminal proceeding against these elected officials. Only 10 deputies were removed from office, and of those just seven in connection to fraud, embezzlement, or corruption charges. Indeed, kompromat deputies were not more likely to be removed and/or prosecuted. Law enforcement activity does not explain the marked turnover in kompromat deputies.

Instead, I argue that the turnover in the Duma is part of a broader dynamic with parties rotating out kompromat deputies from office, who themselves also may prefer shorter terms. First, under the proportional representation system, parties are the main gatekeeper to the ballot. Kompromat deputies can inflict potential damage on party brands. Members of the systemic opposition also more often defect from their party leadership, violate the roll-call unity of systemic opposition parties by siding more often with the regime. Conscious of public scandal and weak member discipline, parties may be rotating out corrupt, vulnerable deputies and cutting short legislative careers in order to preserve their reputation. One observable implication of this is that kompromat deputies who leave office should be younger than other deputies who exit at similar times. Indeed, on average kompromat deputies leave office at 50 years old, compared to 54 years old for those without compromising material.<sup>32</sup>

Another important point is that parties are not selecting out underperforming, lazy deputies.

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<sup>32</sup>In Appendix Table F5, I show that kompromat deputies are also much more likely to find another job after leaving office, rather than retiring completely. This effect is driven by age.

Not only does Table 7 show that showing up to work or proposing bills do not affect re-election chances, but that the kompromat deputies still exit at higher rates controlling for these factors. It appears there is something specific about having observable corruption that can make candidates less appealing over the long-run to parties.

Yet campaigns still need to be funded. Parties must reserve a certain number of seats for corrupt deputies in order to finance elections. An observable implication of this appears in Appendix Table F6. Although kompromat deputies are more likely to lose their seats, those that remain still command top spots on the party lists and leadership positions within the body. Kompromat deputies that remain in office actually enjoy *lower* spots on the subsequent party lists (and therefore will be more likely to enter the next convocation); parties do not completely shun the incidence of corruption, but carefully manage its incidence to maximize their chances of gaining power.

Measuring candidate time horizons and individual desire to remain in office is obviously a more challenging task, especially since interviewing these elites is near impossible during Russia's authoritarian turn. But other evidence from Russia suggests that political connections do not provide ideal long-term protection against repression (Buckley et al., 2022). Deputies may see a timely exit from the Duma as their best chance of protecting their financial gains, and use their seat as a springboard into lower-profile jobs that still allow for enrichment. Indeed, even though kompromat deputies' Duma careers are cut short, Appendix Table F5 draws on data from RuPEP, a publicly available database on Russian elites, to show that kompromat deputies are just as likely to work in government after leaving the parliament. Kompromat deputies often wind up taking seats in the Federation Council, the ceremonial upper house of parliament that plays little role in Russian politics, or working as deputies in regional parliaments. If conditions change, future qualitative research ask deputies about the reasons behind these post-Duma career paths.

## 5 Conclusion

Breaking down the numbers, this paper indicate substantial governance costs from corruption. On average, deputies with hidden income and assets miss 176 more votes, propose two fewer bills, ask 25 fewer questions, and for those from the opposition, vote more in line with the ruling party.

We also see significant clustering of kompromat deputies on committees critical to effective policymaking on economic issues, such as those working on financial services, judicial, small business and even anti-corruption issues (Appendix Figures F1-F2). The results reveals that corruption is indeed systemic within the Russian parliament: just using data on domestic assets uncovers that roughly one-quarter of the members of the country's top legislative body are hiding the true state of their finances from anti-corruption authorities. Why is this degree of corruption sanctioned in the chamber?

One explanation is that the regime prefers not to have a parliament full of ambitious, active members. By rotating the more profit-seeking individuals in and out of office, the regime can more easily ensure the institution does not become a focal point for elite collective action and retains some elements of a rubber-stamping legislative body. Some legislators view their roles more akin to their counterparts in democratic settings: passing legislation not only to extend the their party's hold on power, but also potentially improve societal welfare, protect national security, among other goals. Others shirk their duties while aligning themselves closely with the regime, as to better exploit their position for personal gain. Challengers' obedience can be purchased by being provided access to financial spoils without fear of prosecution. The paper also finds that kompromat deputies in the opposition push for the interests of powerful security services, helping the regime further co-opt and undermine potential challengers.

Thus the key logic of legislative institutions under autocracy may be one of diversity: a regime prefers a body that strikes some balance between ambition and greed, and is willing to overlook some corruption to prevent the development of an autonomous branch that might challenge the executive. Upwards-looking deputies may even prize the kompromat they acquire on their corrupt colleagues. While other regimes may design institutions to attract elites based on their ideological commitment rather than financial interest (Hollyer and Wantchekon, 2015), the case of Russia shows that leaders prefer strategic co-optation. Given the need for external resources and elite cohesion, political parties in autocratic regimes aim for a sweet spot between loyalty and capacity.

There are also good reasons to believe that dynamics in Russia are representative of other competitive authoritarian regimes around the world. Nearly 50% of authoritarian states had multiple parties represented in their legislatures (Simison, 2022). Russia in that sense is no outlier. Yet the

Russian Duma also exhibits the same party discipline coupled with strong pro-government voting behavior as China and Vietnam (Lü, Liu, and Li, 2020; Schuler, 2021). That degree of centralization moves much of the internal jockeying, negotiations, and co-optation behind closed doors, where opportunities for corruption and rent-seeking are heightened. Finally, concerns have been raised about many autocracies exploiting anti-corruption campaigns to both ensure regime loyalty and stabilize regime dynamics (Lorentzen and Lu, 2018). The Russian government's strategic use of disclosures may fit a larger pattern of regimes of autocracies enabling corruption while also dangling the threat of investigation to more efficiently control it.

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Corruption and Cooptation in Autocracy:  
Evidence from Russia

**Supplementary Appendix**

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## A Descriptive Statistics

**TABLE A1: LITERATURE ON RETURNS TO PUBLIC OFFICE**

Paper	Country	Government	Office Type	Data	Years
Mahzab (2020)	Bangladesh	Local	Elected	Disclosures	2009-2020
Cunha (2019)	Brazil	Local	Elected	Disclosures	2008-2016
Kotakorpi, Poutvaara, and Terviö (2017)	Finland	National and local	Elected	Disclosures	1970-2008
Peichl, Pestel, and Siegloch (2013)	Germany	National	Elected	Disclosures	2005-2009
Fisman, Schulz, and Vig (2012)	India	State	Elected	Disclosures	2003-2012
Olejnik (2020)	Poland	State	Elected	Disclosures	2010-2018
Klašnja (2015)	Romania	Local	Elected	Disclosures	2008-2012
Jung (2020)	South Korea	National	Elected	Disclosures	2004-2016
Berg (2020)	Sweden	Local	Elected	Household data	1991-2006
Eggers and Hainmueller (2009)	UK	National	Elected	Estate records	1950-1970
Querubin and Snyder Jr (2013)	USA	National	Elected	Census records	1850-1880
Lenz and Lim (2009)	USA	National	Elected	Disclosures	1995-2005
Fahey (2018)	USA	State	Elected	Disclosures	1995-2014
Eggers and Hainmueller (2014)	USA	National	Elected	Disclosures	2004-2008

**Notes:** This table lists literature on the returns to public office, either analyzed as an outcome variable or analyzed as a predictor of other policy outcomes.

**TABLE A2: REQUIRED INFORMATION IN RUSSIAN DISCLOSURES**

Type of Asset or Income	Description	What Information is Made Public?
Income	Broken out by source: employment, investment, etc.	Total income
Expenses	Both assets and source of income used to purchase	
Real Properties	Type, address, square meters, leased or owned	Type, square meters, country location, leased or owned
Transportation	Make/model and registered location	Make/model
Bank Accounts	Currency, balance, flows	
Company Shares	Equity name, address, share	
Short-term Liabilities	Creditor, term, balance	
Sales of Real Property and Transportation	Buyer(s)	

**FIGURE A1: EXAMPLE FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE, ORIGINAL RUSSIAN**

Фамилия и инициалы лица, чьи сведения размещаются	Должность	Объекты недвижимости, находящиеся в собственности				Объекты недвижимости, находящиеся в пользовании			Транспортные средства (вид, марка)	Декларированный годовой доход (руб.)
		вид объекта	вид собственности	площадь (кв.м)	страна расположения	вид объекта	площадь (кв.м)	страна расположения		
ОСАДЧИЙ Николай Иванович	член комитета Государственной Думы					квартира	80,10	Россия		9581810,44
						квартира	107,21	Россия		
супруга		квартира	индивидуальная	107,21	Россия	квартира	80,10	Россия	автомобили легковые: TOYOTA RAV-4	412875,03
		квартира	индивидуальная	52,30	Россия					
		гаражный бокс	индивидуальная	20,90	Россия					

**Note:** This figure gives a original version of one of the public available disclosures for a State Duma deputy in Russia from 2020.

**FIGURE A2: EXAMPLE FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE, TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH**

Last Name, First Name, Patronymic	Position	Real Estate Ownership				Real Estate in Use			Transportation Assets (make, model)	Declared income
		Type of Property	Ownership	Sq. meters	Country	Type of Property	Sq. meters	Country		
OSADCHY Nikolay Ivanovich	Committee member, State Duma					apartment	80,10	Russia		9581810,44
						apartment	107,21	Russia		
spouse		apartment	individual	107,21	Russia	apartment	80,10	Russia	passenger car: TOYOTA RAV-4	412875,03
		apartment	individual	52,30	Russia					
		garage box	individual	20,90	Russia					

**Note:** This figure gives a translated version of one of the public available disclosures for a State Duma deputy in Russia from 2020.

**TABLE A3: DEPUTIES UNDER INVESTIGATION**

<b>Deputy</b>	<b>Year Indicted</b>	<b>Party</b>	<b>Crime</b>	<b>Found guilty?</b>	<b>Punishment</b>
Vladimir Bessonov	2012	Communist Party	Use of violence against a public official causing minor injury to health	Yes	Sentenced in absentia to 3 years in a minimum security penal colony
Gennady Gudkov	2012	Just Russia	Illegal entrepreneurial activity	No	
Konstantin Shirshov	2012	Communist Party	Attempted fraud	Yes	5 years in a minimum security penal colony
Oleg Miheev	2013	Just Russia	Large scale fraud and obstruction of justice	On the run	
Aleksey Mitrofanov	2014	Just Russia	Large scale fraud committed by an organized group	On the run	
Nikolay Parshin	2014	Communist Party	Fraud committed by a group of persons	Yes	Sentenced in absentia to 3 years of imprisonment and a fine of 500,000 roubles
Ilya Ponomarev	2015	Just Russia	Aiding and abetting embezzlement	On the run	
Vadim Belousov	2018	United Russia	Bribe-taking by an organized group	Yes	10 years in a strict regime penal colony
Nikolay Gerasimenko	2019	United Russia	Violation of traffic rules resulting in significant harm to victims	Yes	Deprived of the right to drive a vehicle for 1 year and six months
Valery Rashkin	2021	Communist Party	Illegal hunting	Yes	3 years suspended sentence with 2 years probation

**Note:** This table lists the 10 deputies who served during the analysis period (2010-2021) and were deprived of their parliamentary immunity in order to face criminal investigations.

**TABLE A4: CHANGES TO FEDERAL DISCLOSURES POLICIES OVER TIME**

<b>Date</b>	<b>Policy Change</b>
May 2009	All ministers, Federation Council members, and Duma deputies as well as an array of other federal and regional officials are now required to publicly report data on the entirety of their incomes and assets.
January 2010	A condensed version of the income and asset disclosures for each official must be made available on the government website for the agency or institution where they work.
January 2011	President Medvedev orders the Tax Service and Prosecutors Office to check all disclosures previously collected over the past two years within three months.
November 2011	Punishments for failing to submit disclosures or reporting inaccurate information are strengthened.
April 2012	The leadership of the Central Bank, Pension Fund, Fund for Social Insurance, and many state-owned companies are now required to report their incomes and assets for themselves and their families. More leaders of state-owner companies are then required to report the next year.
January 2013	All officials are now required to report their large expenditures, in addition to their income and assets. This includes any land plots, real estate, cars, equities, or other financial instruments if the acquisition exceeded their income for the previous three years.
August 2013	Officials can no longer have any foreign bank accounts.
November 2015	Officials can be removed from their position if they do not submit their disclosures on time. Prior to this no punishment mechanism was in place. Also all deputies served on a part-time basis in regional and municipal legislatures are now required to report.
July 2019	Punishments for municipal deputies that submit inaccurate disclosures are weakened. Prior these individuals could be removed from their positions, but now a warning is considered sufficient punishment.
April 2022	A new information service Poseidon is set up to centralize the collection and analysis of disclosures within the federal government
December 2022	Regional and municipal deputies serving on a part-time basis are no longer required to submit complete disclosures, but only have to report about large purchases.
February 2023	Duma deputies and Federation Council members no longer have to publicly declare income and assets. Although they still will report them to authorities, the only information made public will be in generalized form.

**Note:** This table lists the major changes in disclosures law since 2009. Dates in some cases are approximate since they are based on media reporting of changes in enforcement or coverage.

## B Data Construction: Hidden Assets and Income

The first red flag looks at assets that were not reported by deputies in their disclosures. To verify the disclosures data (as well as uncover unreported luxury cars), I first used a list of 129 million 17-digit vehicle identification numbers (VIN) registered in Russia that was leaked online from the Russian traffic agency in May 2020. The unknown leaker claimed the dataset covered approximately 95% of the entire car registration database for the country; several journalists analyzed random samples and confirmed its accuracy.<sup>1</sup> Importantly, this dataset only contains information on car registration numbers and characteristics, rather than owners.

To learn about car ownership, I ran each VIN number through the online portal of the Russian Union of Auto Insurers which allows drivers and government agencies to check the validity of their insurance, for example after car accidents or other traffic disputes. These insurance records include information from nearly every insurance company active in Russia. Because insurance is mandatory, this dataset covers the driver and owner of the vast majority of vehicles driven in Russia.<sup>2</sup> Any person can enter a VIN number and date of interest into the portal, and receive back partially anonymized information about the name of the owner, the person(s) insured to drive it, the insurance provider, policy number, and location of registration (region).<sup>3</sup>

Separate queries for each VIN were run using December 31 of each year from 2011-2019 to see ownership over time. Because of the significant costs of running these queries, I limited the analysis to just the 19 luxury brands included in the list from the Russian Ministry of Industry and Trade (covering 2,742,113 unique VIN numbers); hiding luxury, rather than economy, cars should be a stronger indicator of corruption.<sup>4</sup> For example, accessing ownership data on all makes and models of cars in Russia would cost over \$1 million, an impossible sum for social science researchers. I also identified any cars that deputies owned using leaked data on 43 million entries of car ownership from 2010-2020 from the Moscow and Moscow

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<sup>1</sup>Kinyakina, and Yekaterina Angyelina Kryechyeva “V otkritom dostoopye okazalas’ baza dannih rossiyskih avtovladyel’tsyev” *Vedomosti*, May 14, 2020. Lenta.Ru “Bazoo dannih rossiyskih avtovladyel’tsyev vistavili na prodazhoo v darknyetye” *Lenta.ru*, May 15, 2020.

<sup>2</sup>Stepanov, Dmitriy. “V Rossii zarabotala infosistyema avtostrahovshshikov, pyeryepisannaya za 2 milliarda «s noolya»” *cnews.ru*, June 29, 2020

<sup>3</sup>Owners are partially anonymized in that the only the first name, middle name (patronymic), first letter of the last name, and the full birthdate are given. Matching even without the complete last name data is not introducing significant noise into the corruption measure. This issue should not cause issues for the measurement since individuals (as defined by unique values across these variables) only own on average only 1.43 luxury cars from 2011-2019.

<sup>4</sup>The brands are Aston Martin, Audi, Bentley, BMW, Cadillac, Ferrari, Genesis, Hummer, Infiniti, Jaguar, Lamborghini, Land Rover, Lexus, Lincoln, Maybach, Maserati, Mercedes, Porsche, Rolls Royce, and Volvo.

Oblast GIBDD<sup>5</sup>. As a validation check, I was able to locate 81.2% of deputies' reported cars in either the insurance or the GIBDD data, a positive sign that together these two leaked datasets have strong coverage of the automobile market in Russia.

For the second red flag, I calculated the ratio of total income earned by a deputy and his or her family each year to the total imputed market value of disclosed cars, using the methodology outlined in the main text. One concern with using this approach to identify illicit income is that deputies may be able to obtain car loans to finance their luxury car purchases. The red flag would then be mischaracterizing deputies with such access to finance as having kompromat. According to the Russian website Autostat.ru, indeed roughly one-third of Russian car buyers used a loan to finance their vehicle purchases from 2010-2021.<sup>6</sup>

To address this concern, I collected data on whether car buyers used a loan using publicly available information. One all-too-common problem on the used car market in Russia happens when a buyer purchases a vehicle, only to later learn that there is still an outstanding loan on the car or that the car is being used as collateral for another loan. Sellers often hide information about the outstanding loan and accept the money for the vehicle without paying it off, leaving buyers to deal with the financial institution which wants to be paid back. There are many stories in media covering this common type of fraud and types of civil cases that banks initiate against both past and current owners to get repaid.<sup>7</sup> In response, dozens of online services in Russia allow potential car buyers to check the histories of their vehicles to ensure there are no outstanding loans.

In 2017, the Russian government set up a publicly available "Register of Collateral of Transportation Assets". Like the insurance register used to identify car drivers, this service allows anyone to freely inquire whether a vehicle is being used as collateral (either because of an initial loan to purchase it or because a 'personal car loan' being taken out on it where the owner receives cash). Banks enter information about both types of loans immediately, and the register allows any user to query based on the name and birthdate of any individual to inquire about their car-related credit history, with data going back to January 2013.

To detect whether deputies were buying cars using loans, I queried this collateral register for each of the 1,034 individual deputies using their full name and birthdate. In all, just 8 deputies purchased a car from

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<sup>5</sup>GIBDD translates to the 'General Administration for Traffic Safety' and is the equivalent to the Department of Motor Vehicles in the US.

<sup>6</sup>Autostat "Skolko avtomobiley rossiyane pokupayut v kredit?", October 21, 2020

<sup>7</sup>Natalya Kozlova "VS RF: Chto delat, yesli kuplennaya mashina okazalas v zaloge" Rossisskaya Gazeta, August 11, 2019; Anastasia Manukhina. "Kak proverit avto na zalog: vse vozmozhnyye sposoby i instruktsii", Autonews November 10, 2021; Igor Telezhkin, "Kupil mashinu, a yeye zabirayet bank kak zalog. Chto delat vladeltsu avto — otvechayet yurist" 59.ru September 11, 2021.

2013 to 2021 using a car loan. Importantly we see that the banks listed on the entries include “Toyota Bank” and “Mercedes Benz Bank Rus”, indicating that these buyers obtained their loans directly from the dealer. In addition, the VIN (car identification) numbers listed match to the data from the disclosures. Given their cash on hand, deputies do not appear to be using car loans as frequently as the general public. I have updated all the results in the paper to include an indicator for whether a deputy ever took out a loan to buy a car. In Appendix Table D4, I also adopt a more conservative approach of removing the kompromat designation from any deputies who ever used a loan to buy a car (even if it was in relation to just one of the multiple cars owned). Finally, as an additional check, I include a control for the number of real estate assets owned, which presumably would be used as collateral for any car loans. The results are robust to all of these steps.


Second, car loans in Russia, like in many Western countries, are on average of a duration of three years. Therefore, even if the collateral-based measure above was missing some financing arrangements, we should expect deputy income to be sufficient over the course of those three years to fully pay off the cars purchased. The measure of kompromat used in the paper looks at the average ratio of income to car valuations over a deputy’s years in office, with those having average car values greater than their average income receiving a red flag. Take an example of deputy earning the equivalent of \$100,000 in 2014. If she was to buy a car worth the same amount that year using a three-year loan at a 12% interest rate and 10% down payment, she would owe a total of \$117,614.36 over the three years, or just under 40% of her annual salary of \$100,000 each of those years. It is very unclear whether banks would even lend based on that debt to income ratio. In addition, I account for salary raises by looking at the ratio of income over car values over an entire term, and flag deputies that on average drive cars that are more expensive than the money they earned every year. Given the lending example above, that threshold may even seem conservative. I also show in Appendix Table

**TABLE B1: TOP 15 MOST COMMON CAR MAKES OWNED BY DEPUTIES**

Make	Num. Cars	Mean Price (Rub)	Mean Price (USD)
Mercedes-Benz	591	4,564,839	70,228
Toyota	352	4,182,133	64,341
Lexus	218	5,114,164	78,679
BMW	198	3,275,173	50,387
Audi	118	3,106,638	47,794
Volkswagen	99	2,260,263	34,773
VAZ	99	431,895.5	6,645
Land Rover	90	4,879,530	75,070
Nissan	81	1,767,380	27,190
Porsche	74	4,743,235	72,973
GAZ	70	667,974.6	10,277
Mitsubishi	57	2,253,686	34,672
Hyundai	53	1,713,944	26,368
Volvo	48	3,224,480	49,607
Chevrolet	39	2,292,166	35,264


**Note:** This table shows the 15 most common car makes (manufacturers) owned by deputies from 2010-2021. Mean price is calculated using the methodology described in [Braguinsky, Mityakov, and Liscovich \(2014\)](#), with prices shown in rubles and dollars (at an exchange rate of 65 rubles per dollar). Where manufacture year is missing, I assumed that the manufacture year was three years prior to the first year the car appeared on a disclosure. Beyond the car makes shown here, deputies declared 21 Bentleys, 14 Jaguars, 5 Maybachs, and 2 Ferraris.

**FIGURE B1: MEAN DEPUTY HOUSEHOLD INCOME OVER TIME BY PARTY**



**Note:** This figure plots the mean total deputy household income broken out by party over time. All income has been converted to thousands of USD using annual ruble-dollar exchange rates from the OECD. Convocations are distinguished by the dotted lines.

**FIGURE B2: HIDDEN WEALTH RED FLAGS OVER TIME**



**Note:** This figure plots the percentage of deputies that either had undeclared cars or had an hidden earnings ratio of above 1 during their time in office. Convocations are distinguished by the dotted lines.

**TABLE B2: PREDICTORS OF CORRUPTION MEASURE**

	Kompromat Deputy					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Constant	1.59*** (0.368)	1.33*** (0.380)		2.98*** (0.445)	2.79*** (0.455)	
Family Real Estate Assets (ihs)	0.008 (0.007)	0.007 (0.007)	0.005 (0.007)	0.018** (0.007)	0.017** (0.007)	0.015** (0.007)
Age (log)	-0.274*** (0.071)	-0.229*** (0.076)	-0.222*** (0.076)	-0.295*** (0.070)	-0.264*** (0.075)	-0.259*** (0.075)
Died in Office	-0.069 (0.093)	-0.065 (0.092)	0.0001 (0.087)	-0.091 (0.128)	-0.097 (0.129)	-0.018 (0.110)
Female	-0.118*** (0.033)	-0.121*** (0.034)	-0.121*** (0.034)	-0.104*** (0.034)	-0.107*** (0.034)	-0.107*** (0.034)
Attended Top University	-0.035 (0.041)	-0.028 (0.042)	-0.026 (0.042)	-0.041 (0.040)	-0.033 (0.041)	-0.032 (0.041)
Committee Leader	-0.054** (0.024)	-0.056** (0.024)	-0.064*** (0.024)	-0.049** (0.024)	-0.050** (0.024)	-0.055** (0.024)
Fraction Chair	0.010 (0.064)	0.012 (0.064)	0.018 (0.065)	-0.013 (0.064)	-0.005 (0.065)	0.0008 (0.065)
SMD Deputy	-0.099*** (0.027)	-0.108*** (0.027)	-0.024 (0.033)	-0.081*** (0.027)	-0.091*** (0.027)	-0.041 (0.034)
Years in Office	0.003 (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)	0.003 (0.003)	0.005* (0.003)	0.005** (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)
Number of Votes (log)	-0.035 (0.029)	-0.028 (0.029)	0.032 (0.035)	-0.048 (0.037)	-0.044 (0.037)	0.059 (0.043)
Celebrity	0.063 (0.061)	0.061 (0.062)	0.069 (0.062)	0.083 (0.060)	0.081 (0.061)	0.085 (0.061)
Significant Business Interests	0.020 (0.036)	0.014 (0.037)	0.015 (0.036)	0.071* (0.038)	0.066* (0.038)	0.062* (0.038)
Health Care	-0.181*** (0.043)	-0.187*** (0.044)	-0.155*** (0.047)	-0.196*** (0.047)	-0.206*** (0.049)	-0.172*** (0.051)
Pensioner / Unemployed	0.043 (0.103)	0.047 (0.102)	0.037 (0.099)	0.003 (0.105)	0.005 (0.104)	0.003 (0.102)
Civil Society	-0.071 (0.053)	-0.066 (0.054)	-0.045 (0.053)	-0.096* (0.054)	-0.095* (0.055)	-0.079 (0.055)
Education	-0.019 (0.060)	-0.016 (0.061)	-0.011 (0.060)	-0.052 (0.059)	-0.050 (0.059)	-0.046 (0.059)
Government	0.007 (0.038)	0.003 (0.039)	0.015 (0.039)	-0.024 (0.039)	-0.029 (0.039)	-0.020 (0.039)
Blue Collar Worker	-0.155 (0.098)	-0.170* (0.099)	-0.145 (0.098)	-0.163 (0.104)	-0.183* (0.105)	-0.164 (0.104)
Member: United Russia		0.051 (0.046)	0.047 (0.046)		0.065 (0.047)	0.062 (0.047)
Member: Communist Party		-0.022 (0.058)	-0.016 (0.058)		0.001 (0.060)	0.010 (0.060)
Member: LDPR		0.114 (0.071)	0.133* (0.071)		0.103 (0.071)	0.112 (0.071)
Change in Income Over Term				-0.004 (0.010)	-0.004 (0.010)	0.004 (0.011)
Deputy Income, First Year (log)				-0.083*** (0.011)	-0.083*** (0.011)	-0.078*** (0.011)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.053	0.059	0.073	0.094	0.099	0.109
Observations	1,414	1,414	1,414	1,325	1,325	1,325
Convocation fixed effects			✓			✓


**Note:** \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1 This table analyzes the predictors of being flagged as a kompromat deputy based on either of the two red flags. The unit of analysis is the deputy-convocation. The reference category for the party member predictors is Just Russia. All models use OLS with standard errors are clustered on the deputy level.

**TABLE B3: BALANCE TABLE**

<b>Kompromat Deputy:</b>	No	Yes	Difference	
	Mean	Mean		
Age (log)	3.947	3.882	-0.065	*
Member: United Russia	0.660	0.641	-0.019	
Member: Communist Party	0.154	0.107	-0.047	
Member: LDPR	0.088	0.172	0.084	*
Member: Just Russia	0.097	0.080	-0.018	
Attended Top University	0.150	0.138	-0.012	
Died in Office	0.011	0.006	-0.005	
Female	0.170	0.074	-0.096	*
Committee Leader	0.389	0.319	-0.070	*
Fraction Chair	0.051	0.061	0.010	
SMD Deputy	0.184	0.101	-0.083	*
Years in Office	5.806	5.804	-0.002	
Celebrity	0.071	0.083	0.012	
Significant Business Interests	0.331	0.390	0.059	
Health Care	0.013	0.000	-0.013	
Pensioner / Unemployed	0.014	0.015	0.002	
Civil Society	0.071	0.049	-0.022	
Education	0.046	0.040	-0.006	
Government	0.702	0.721	0.019	
Blue Collar Worker	0.009	0.003	-0.006	

**Note:** \*  $p < 0.05$ . This table shows the means and differences in means for deputy covariates based on whether they were coded as a 'kompromat deputy' or not.

**FIGURE B3: DEPUTY IDEAL POINTS BY PARTY AND CONVOCATION**



**Note:** This figure plots the ideal points for deputy-convocations in the analysis database, using the United Russia fraction leader as the reference point. Each color represents members of the four political parties with representation during 2010-2021, which random noise introduced across the x-axis to better illustrate variation. Greater scores indicate closer voting affinity with United Russia leadership.

## C Robustness Checks: Shirking

**TABLE C1: CORRUPTION AND SHIRKING, PARTY HETEROGENEITY**

	Absenteeism (all)		Bills (ihs)		Questions (ihs)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Kompromat Deputy	0.222 (0.333)	2.39** (1.00)	-0.046 (0.035)	-0.165 (0.109)	-0.155 (0.173)	-0.146 (0.219)
Family Real Estate Assets (ihs)	0.158 (0.259)	0.478 (0.759)	-0.020 (0.023)	-0.010 (0.066)	-0.176 (0.109)	-0.162 (0.175)
Ever Had Car Loan	0.188 (1.76)		-0.053 (0.084)		-0.391 (0.699)	
Age (log)	-0.505 (0.694)	-1.16 (2.42)	-0.051 (0.065)	-0.317 (0.242)	0.154 (0.304)	-0.436 (0.455)
Died in Office	9.99** (3.99)	6.57* (3.51)	0.092 (0.143)	-0.375** (0.168)	-0.925** (0.362)	-0.356 (0.799)
Female	-0.902*** (0.341)	-0.757 (1.29)	-0.063* (0.034)	-0.199 (0.151)	0.202 (0.144)	0.503 (0.311)
Attended Top University	0.131 (0.439)	2.37** (1.11)	0.051 (0.066)	0.110 (0.108)	0.377* (0.203)	-0.068 (0.256)
Committee Leader	-0.607** (0.256)	-0.309 (0.942)	0.063** (0.032)	0.129 (0.082)	1.09*** (0.120)	0.254 (0.184)
Fraction Chair	-2.05*** (0.579)	-2.83** (1.33)	0.025 (0.095)	0.322* (0.176)	0.820** (0.357)	1.50*** (0.300)
SMD Deputy	1.70** (0.708)	-2.96 (2.10)	-0.012 (0.044)	0.131 (0.218)	0.051 (0.174)	0.623** (0.267)
Years in Office	0.246*** (0.054)	0.114 (0.095)	0.003 (0.004)	-0.007 (0.010)	-0.013 (0.016)	0.009 (0.023)
Number of Votes (log)	0.190 (0.654)	-1.36 (1.32)	-0.089* (0.048)	0.104* (0.061)	1.09*** (0.149)	0.800*** (0.136)
Celebrity	1.18* (0.638)	3.24* (1.87)	0.033 (0.072)	0.039 (0.146)	-0.976*** (0.238)	-0.393 (0.402)
Significant Business Interests	0.137 (0.362)	2.82** (1.13)	0.033 (0.039)	0.056 (0.132)	-0.623*** (0.167)	-0.773*** (0.267)
Member: Communist Party		4.51*** (1.10)		-0.105 (0.105)		-0.303 (0.278)
Member: LDPR		14.2*** (1.15)		0.162 (0.135)		0.151 (0.298)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.319	0.400	0.035	0.129	0.240	0.221
Observations	927	487	927	487	927	487
Party Subset	UR	Non-UR	UR	Non-UR	UR	Non-UR
Oster's $\delta$ for $\beta = 0$	-1.11	2.17	-19.6	-6.46	1.44	2.85
Convocation fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Occupation fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

**Note:** \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1 The unit of analysis is the deputy-convocation, subset by whether the deputy is the member of the ruling party United Russia (odd columns) or a systemic opposition party (even columns). Absenteeism is the percentage of all votes a deputy missed during the convocation. Columns 3 and 4 analyze the weighted number of bills initiated by deputy, and Columns 5 and 6 measure the number of questions asked during debates. The reference category for the party member predictors in the even columns is Just Russia. All models are estimated using OLS with standard errors clustered at the deputy level.

**TABLE C2: CORRUPTION AND SHIRKING, UNTRANSFORMED OUTCOMES**

	Bills (alone)		Questions		Bills (alone, log)		Questions (log)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Komproamat Deputy	-0.187 (0.120)	-0.182 (0.120)	-19.7** (8.22)	-18.9** (8.55)	-0.060* (0.034)	-0.060* (0.034)	-0.234* (0.129)	-0.181 (0.123)
Family Real Estate Assets (ihs)	-0.070 (0.077)	-0.088 (0.079)	-15.3*** (5.33)	-14.5** (5.94)	-0.012 (0.021)	-0.014 (0.022)	-0.255*** (0.085)	-0.179** (0.085)
Ever Had Car Loan	-0.218 (0.134)	-0.225 (0.141)	12.3 (40.4)	16.3 (39.5)	-0.082 (0.076)	-0.083 (0.071)	-0.252 (0.720)	-0.193 (0.675)
Age (log)	-0.289 (0.202)	-0.354 (0.216)	39.6** (17.5)	5.63 (17.2)	-0.104* (0.062)	-0.135** (0.068)	0.386 (0.244)	0.027 (0.229)
Member: United Russia	-0.711*** (0.211)	-0.637*** (0.208)	-60.0*** (15.4)	-38.4*** (13.0)	-0.281*** (0.062)	-0.250*** (0.060)	-0.897*** (0.194)	-0.754*** (0.176)
Member: Communist Party	-0.428* (0.231)	-0.343 (0.225)	4.34 (25.8)	19.3 (25.2)	-0.137* (0.073)	-0.109 (0.071)	-0.287 (0.256)	-0.253 (0.234)
Member: LDPR	0.729* (0.428)	0.768* (0.422)	18.7 (26.1)	34.9 (24.4)	0.128 (0.104)	0.145 (0.102)	0.080 (0.260)	0.234 (0.242)
Died in Office	-0.126 (0.157)	-0.092 (0.206)	-54.9*** (18.2)	-50.8*** (17.1)	-0.018 (0.088)	-0.024 (0.100)	-1.30*** (0.410)	-0.798** (0.349)
Female	-0.276*** (0.091)	-0.263*** (0.091)	-1.99 (9.33)	-2.17 (9.12)	-0.092*** (0.035)	-0.092*** (0.035)	0.362*** (0.127)	0.242** (0.121)
Attended Top University	0.137 (0.153)	0.122 (0.154)	5.04 (13.3)	2.13 (12.2)	0.060 (0.048)	0.054 (0.048)	0.241 (0.158)	0.188 (0.148)
Committee Leader		0.306*** (0.096)		28.3*** (7.96)		0.076*** (0.027)		0.697*** (0.093)
Fraction Chair		0.367 (0.268)		120.3*** (33.4)		0.155* (0.085)		1.14*** (0.208)
SMD Deputy		-0.060 (0.119)		2.40 (10.4)		-0.020 (0.041)		0.171 (0.135)
Years in Office		-0.009 (0.011)		1.92** (0.940)		-0.002 (0.004)		0.002 (0.012)
Number of Votes (log)		0.168* (0.099)		33.9*** (5.60)		0.029 (0.033)		0.790*** (0.094)
Celebrity		0.063 (0.128)		-40.2*** (15.0)		0.025 (0.052)		-0.729*** (0.181)
Significant Business Interests		0.180 (0.144)		-9.55 (9.44)		0.029 (0.039)		-0.599*** (0.127)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.098	0.121	0.078	0.168	0.113	0.135	0.095	0.240
Observations	1,414	1,414	1,414	1,414	1,414	1,414	1,414	1,414
Oster's $\delta$ for $\beta = 0$	-6.12	-6.53	11.66	9.89	-8.38	-8.71	4.96	2.97
Convocation fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Occupation fixed effects		✓		✓		✓		✓

**Note:** \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$  This table shows results using different measures of legislative shirking as the outcome variables. The unit of analysis is the deputy-convocation. Columns 1 and 2 analyze the number of bills initiated by deputy, and Columns 3 and 4 measure the number of questions asked during debates. All outcome measures are untransformed, unlike the main text which applies an IHS transformation. The reference category for the party member predictors is Just Russia. All models are estimated using OLS with standard errors clustered at the deputy level.

**TABLE C3: CORRUPTION AND ABSENTEEISM, BROKEN OUT BY VOTE**

	Absenteeism (all)		Absenteeism (1st)		Absenteeism (2nd)		Absenteeism (3rd)		Sessions Attended (%)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Kompromat Deputy	1.14** (0.462)	1.02** (0.453)	1.03** (0.422)	0.947** (0.415)	1.26** (0.616)	1.13* (0.602)	1.31*** (0.473)	1.16** (0.459)	-0.570* (0.317)	-0.424 (0.302)
Family Real Estate Assets (ihs)	0.582* (0.319)	0.358 (0.332)	0.426 (0.281)	0.321 (0.297)	0.845** (0.427)	0.408 (0.442)	0.456 (0.338)	0.179 (0.349)	-0.310 (0.188)	-0.113 (0.197)
Ever Had Car Loan	0.132 (2.00)	0.108 (1.93)	-0.688 (1.94)	-0.888 (2.05)	1.80 (2.03)	1.91 (1.70)	1.06 (2.38)	1.20 (2.19)	-1.67 (2.28)	-1.99 (2.07)
Age (log)	0.774 (0.795)	-0.110 (0.908)	0.583 (0.710)	-0.264 (0.810)	0.712 (1.10)	0.236 (1.22)	0.793 (0.864)	0.104 (0.974)	-0.571 (0.515)	-0.054 (0.559)
Member: United Russia	-2.82*** (0.789)	-2.92*** (0.810)	15.5*** (0.819)	15.5*** (0.844)	-23.3*** (0.825)	-23.6*** (0.843)	-21.6*** (0.804)	-21.9*** (0.809)	1.79*** (0.567)	1.94*** (0.580)
Member: Communist Party	3.44*** (0.950)	3.29*** (0.979)	5.05*** (0.956)	4.91*** (0.980)	2.17** (1.02)	2.13** (1.05)	0.983 (0.982)	0.757 (1.01)	3.15*** (0.606)	3.19*** (0.620)
Member: LDPR	14.6*** (1.19)	14.5*** (1.16)	11.7*** (1.17)	11.5*** (1.14)	26.1*** (1.58)	26.3*** (1.55)	8.39*** (1.16)	8.35*** (1.11)	1.81*** (0.668)	1.69*** (0.641)
Died in Office	9.67*** (3.20)	8.30*** (3.10)	7.64*** (2.60)	6.25** (2.53)	9.71*** (3.67)	8.77** (3.61)	8.52** (3.43)	7.22** (3.34)	-6.55* (3.85)	-5.77 (3.71)
Female	-0.655 (0.441)	-0.559 (0.458)	-0.376 (0.399)	-0.258 (0.422)	-0.728 (0.580)	-0.680 (0.600)	-1.00** (0.442)	-0.973** (0.454)	0.917*** (0.303)	0.955*** (0.317)
Attended Top University	1.25** (0.582)	1.09* (0.571)	1.32** (0.546)	1.18** (0.537)	1.13 (0.742)	0.967 (0.725)	0.877 (0.603)	0.716 (0.591)	-0.422 (0.380)	-0.303 (0.350)
Committee Leader		-0.704* (0.387)		-0.323 (0.367)		-1.17** (0.518)		-1.04*** (0.390)		0.862*** (0.234)
Fraction Chair		-2.86*** (0.826)		-2.27*** (0.740)		-3.40*** (1.13)		-3.40*** (0.799)		1.29** (0.549)
SMD Deputy		1.02 (0.729)		-0.475 (0.599)		3.32*** (1.07)		2.17** (0.859)		-2.18*** (0.657)
Years in Office		0.178*** (0.047)		0.144*** (0.040)		0.195*** (0.060)		0.175*** (0.053)		-0.100*** (0.038)
Number of Votes (log)		-0.826 (0.962)		-1.06 (1.07)		-0.155 (0.934)		-0.875 (0.871)		0.392 (0.350)
Celebrity		1.85** (0.755)		1.36* (0.714)		2.39*** (0.875)		2.30*** (0.832)		-2.03*** (0.642)
Significant Business Interests		1.07** (0.462)		0.867** (0.423)		1.35** (0.601)		1.12** (0.486)		-0.643** (0.326)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.411	0.433	0.443	0.459	0.771	0.780	0.741	0.753	0.347	0.384
Observations	1,414	1,414	1,414	1,414	1,414	1,414	1,414	1,414	1,414	1,414
Oster's $\delta$ for $\beta = 0$	5	3.77	24.14	13.26	2	1.75	17.81	9.48	-2	-1.78
Convocation fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Occupation fixed effects		✓		✓		✓		✓		✓

**Note:** \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1 The unit of analysis is the deputy-convocation. Absenteeism is the percentage of all votes a deputy missed during the convocation, with models breaking out all votes and then by the reading. The reference category for the party member predictors in the even columns is Just Russia. All models are estimated using OLS with standard errors clustered at the deputy level.

**TABLE C4: LEGISLATIVE HETEROGENEITY**

	Budgets (1)	Constitutional Issues (2)	Defense / Security (3)	Economic Policy (4)	Social Policy (5)
Kompromat Deputy	0.007** (0.003)	0.005*** (0.002)	0.003** (0.001)	0.009*** (0.003)	0.004*** (0.001)
Family Real Estate Assets (ihs)	0.003 (0.002)	0.001 (0.001)	0.0002 (0.0009)	0.0006 (0.002)	0.0005 (0.0009)
Ever Had Car Loan	-0.027*** (0.004)	-0.012*** (0.003)	-0.010*** (0.002)	-0.021*** (0.003)	-0.010*** (0.002)
Age (log)	-0.005 (0.007)	-0.008 (0.006)	-0.002 (0.003)	0.001 (0.006)	0.001 (0.003)
Member: United Russia	0.238*** (0.007)	0.046*** (0.002)	0.059*** (0.002)	0.097*** (0.003)	0.121*** (0.003)
Member: Communist Party	-0.095*** (0.009)	-0.094*** (0.005)	-0.021*** (0.003)	-0.091*** (0.007)	-0.048*** (0.004)
Member: LDPR	0.158*** (0.007)	0.021*** (0.003)	0.027*** (0.002)	0.066*** (0.004)	0.083*** (0.003)
Died in Office	0.012 (0.013)	0.026** (0.012)	0.009 (0.006)	0.025** (0.012)	-0.002 (0.005)
Female	-0.003 (0.004)	0.0003 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.001)	-0.0003 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.002)
Attended Top University	-0.004 (0.004)	0.002 (0.002)	-0.0010 (0.002)	0.0005 (0.003)	0.001 (0.002)
Committee Leader	0.016*** (0.003)	0.004** (0.002)	0.005*** (0.001)	0.009*** (0.003)	0.006*** (0.001)
Fraction Chair	-0.005 (0.008)	-0.0007 (0.003)	0.0003 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.006)	0.003 (0.003)
SMD Deputy	-0.020*** (0.004)	-0.007*** (0.002)	-0.005*** (0.001)	-0.011*** (0.003)	-0.008*** (0.002)
Years in Office	-0.0004 (0.0003)	$-8.83 \times 10^{-5}$ (0.0002)	-0.0003** (0.0001)	-0.0007** (0.0003)	-0.0002 (0.0002)
Number of Votes (log)	-0.011 (0.007)	0.025 (0.020)	-0.003 (0.003)	0.0003 (0.006)	-0.009** (0.004)
Celebrity	-0.006 (0.006)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.004 (0.005)	0.002 (0.002)
Significant Business Interests	0.0003 (0.003)	-0.0005 (0.002)	0.0003 (0.001)	0.002 (0.002)	0.002 (0.001)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.833	0.642	0.651	0.617	0.863
Observations	1,414	1,411	1,412	1,411	1,413
Convocation fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Occupation fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

**Note:** \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1 This table looks at degree of deputy voting support for government-sponsored bills, broken down by issue type based on committee assignment. Bills involved treaty ratifications are omitted. All models are estimated using OLS with standard errors clustered at the deputy level.

**TABLE C5: CORRUPTION AND BILL SPONSORSHIP, ROBUSTNESS**

	Bills (ihs) (1)	Bills (weighted, ihs) (2)	Bills (any, ihs) (3)
Kompromat Deputy	-0.078* (0.044)	-0.116* (0.065)	-0.074 (0.079)
Family Real Estate Assets (ihs)	-0.017 (0.028)	-0.081* (0.042)	-0.081 (0.052)
Ever Had Car Loan	-0.107 (0.091)	-0.367* (0.220)	-0.709* (0.367)
Age (log)	-0.174** (0.086)	-0.429*** (0.129)	-0.236 (0.159)
Member: United Russia	-0.323*** (0.077)	-0.653*** (0.106)	-0.303*** (0.108)
Member: Communist Party	-0.138 (0.091)	-0.693*** (0.121)	-0.671*** (0.132)
Member: LDPR	0.180 (0.129)	-0.106 (0.147)	-0.502*** (0.148)
Died in Office	-0.034 (0.127)	-0.128 (0.149)	-0.147 (0.208)
Female	-0.117** (0.046)	-0.096 (0.071)	0.142 (0.088)
Attended Top University	0.070 (0.061)	0.093 (0.086)	0.011 (0.097)
Committee Leader	0.096*** (0.035)	0.243*** (0.052)	0.252*** (0.061)
Fraction Chair	0.201* (0.109)	0.704*** (0.128)	0.886*** (0.129)
SMD Deputy	-0.026 (0.052)	-0.223*** (0.073)	-0.187** (0.088)
Years in Office	-0.002 (0.004)	0.011 (0.007)	0.005 (0.007)
Number of Votes (log)	0.036 (0.042)	0.395*** (0.059)	0.837*** (0.117)
Celebrity	0.034 (0.067)	-0.210* (0.122)	-0.404*** (0.138)
Significant Business Interests	0.036 (0.050)	-0.033 (0.067)	-0.035 (0.076)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.134	0.271	0.409
Observations	1,414	1,414	1,414
Oster's $\delta$ for $\beta = 0$	-8.89	9.58	0.81
Occupation fixed effects	✓	✓	✓
Convocation fixed effects	✓	✓	✓

**Note:** \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1 This table shows results using different measures of bill sponsorship. Column 1 replicates the results from Table 3 in the Main Test that uses a measure of deputy solo sponsorship of bills. Column 2 uses a weighted measure of bill sponsorship (ihs). Column 3 measures the total number of bills a deputy's name appeared on (ihs). The reference category for the party member predictors is Just Russia. All models are estimated using OLS with standard errors clustered at the deputy level.

## D Robustness Checks: Varying Kompromat Measures and Standard Errors

**TABLE D1: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS WITH ERRORS CLUSTERED ON PARTY-CONVOCAATION**

	Absenteeism (all) (1)	Bills (ihs) (2)	Questions (ihs) (3)	Govt Bills (all) (4)	(5)	Ideal Point (6)	(7)	Re-elected (8)
Kompromat Deputy	1.02* (0.509)	-0.078** (0.033)	-0.191 (0.120)	-0.025 (0.048)	0.684** (0.270)	-0.026 (0.052)	0.242** (0.082)	-0.114*** (0.022)
Family Real Estate Assets (ihs)	0.358 (0.311)	-0.017 (0.025)	-0.201** (0.070)	-0.002 (0.004)	0.016 (0.123)	0.004 (0.012)	-0.013 (0.045)	0.010 (0.018)
Ever Had Car Loan	0.108 (1.05)	-0.107 (0.069)	-0.273 (0.508)	0.049 (0.026)		-0.015 (0.057)		0.189 (0.113)
Age (log)	-0.110 (0.969)	-0.174** (0.069)	0.004 (0.140)	-0.029 (0.021)	0.087 (0.681)	0.012 (0.005)	0.068 (0.239)	-0.331*** (0.059)
Member: United Russia	-2.92** (1.25)	-0.323*** (0.045)	-0.797*** (0.125)					0.567** (0.231)
Member: Communist Party	3.29 (2.31)	-0.138** (0.059)	-0.371 (0.263)		-3.76** (1.39)		-3.56*** (0.548)	-0.044 (0.234)
Member: LDPR	14.5* (7.25)	0.180 (0.113)	0.201 (0.170)		5.45*** (1.24)		1.47** (0.510)	0.053 (0.203)
Died in Office	8.30*** (2.25)	-0.034 (0.196)	-0.922** (0.373)	-0.040 (0.029)	1.37 (0.980)	-0.151 (0.070)	0.905* (0.423)	
Female	-0.559 (0.709)	-0.117** (0.040)	0.353*** (0.109)	0.012 (0.007)	0.790** (0.332)	0.025 (0.027)	0.249 (0.147)	-0.038 (0.059)
Attended Top University	1.09* (0.589)	0.070* (0.036)	0.317 (0.179)	-0.024 (0.010)	0.204 (0.144)	-0.009 (0.014)	0.150** (0.062)	
Committee Leader	-0.704 (0.645)	0.096** (0.035)	0.860*** (0.170)	0.011 (0.004)	0.290 (0.172)	0.017 (0.023)	-0.002 (0.063)	0.194*** (0.031)
Fraction Chair	-2.86** (1.03)	0.201* (0.101)	1.31*** (0.357)	0.046* (0.015)	-0.171 (0.409)	0.108 (0.062)	-0.102 (0.149)	0.332*** (0.062)
SMD Deputy	1.02 (1.34)	-0.026 (0.028)	0.175 (0.152)	-0.049*** (0.005)	-0.463 (0.302)	-0.096*** (0.007)	-0.266 (0.170)	0.018 (0.037)
Years in Office	0.178* (0.092)	-0.002 (0.004)	0.008 (0.010)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.008 (0.029)	-0.013** (0.003)	-0.004 (0.008)	0.013*** (0.003)
Number of Votes (log)	-0.826 (0.884)	0.036 (0.055)	0.943*** (0.128)	-0.019 (0.038)	-0.718 (0.509)	0.898*** (0.039)	-0.416 (0.236)	-0.025 (0.058)
Celebrity	1.85* (0.946)	0.034 (0.049)	-0.822*** (0.152)	0.020 (0.021)	-0.178 (0.318)	0.013 (0.031)	0.053 (0.080)	0.127*** (0.041)
Significant Business Interests	1.07* (0.548)	0.036 (0.023)	-0.709*** (0.168)	0.002 (0.004)	0.220 (0.286)	0.012** (0.003)	0.187* (0.092)	0.075** (0.025)
Ideal Point								-0.063** (0.026)
Absenteeism (all)								0.005* (0.002)
Bills (ihs)								-0.039* (0.019)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.433	0.134	0.231	0.079	0.825	0.799	0.893	0.141
Observations	1,414	1,414	1,414	927	487	927	487	1,344
Party Subset	None	None	None	UR	Non-UR	UR	Non-UR	None
Oster's $\delta$ for $\beta = 0$	3.77	-8.89	2.66	5.68	2.07	-0.79	1.93	-17.81
Occupation fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Convocation fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

**Note:** \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1 This table shows the main results related to shirking, regime loyalty, and turnover in office. All models are estimated using OLS with standard errors clustered at the party-convocation level rather than the deputy level as shown in the main text.

**TABLE D2: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS USING CONTINUOUS MEASURE OF CAR EARNINGS**

	Absenteeism (all)	Bills (ihs)	Questions (ihs)	Govt Bills (all)		Ideal Point		Re-elected
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Kompromat: Ratio of Cars to Income	0.442* (0.255)	-0.045** (0.022)	-0.091 (0.080)	-0.011 (0.007)	0.317*** (0.115)	-0.012 (0.019)	0.134*** (0.046)	-0.089*** (0.017)
Family Real Estate Assets (ihs)	0.719* (0.371)	-0.035 (0.033)	-0.367*** (0.114)	-0.009 (0.008)	0.045 (0.180)	-0.019 (0.018)	0.017 (0.073)	-0.007 (0.024)
Ever Had Car Loan	0.365 (2.16)	-0.207*** (0.047)	-0.771 (0.586)	0.033 (0.023)		-0.024 (0.053)		0.155 (0.164)
Age (log)	0.063 (0.977)	-0.226** (0.107)	0.118 (0.316)	-0.022 (0.027)	0.318 (0.586)	0.040 (0.045)	0.089 (0.228)	-0.263*** (0.081)
Member: United Russia	-2.91*** (1.01)	-0.357*** (0.090)	-0.792*** (0.230)					0.561*** (0.156)
Member: Communist Party	3.00** (1.19)	-0.126 (0.108)	-0.201 (0.288)		-3.66*** (0.304)		-3.60*** (0.121)	-0.049 (0.110)
Member: LDPR	14.7*** (1.31)	0.167 (0.144)	0.096 (0.319)		5.69*** (0.296)		1.58*** (0.106)	0.089 (0.072)
Died in Office	6.47* (3.60)	-0.137 (0.138)	-0.506 (0.396)	-0.017 (0.039)	2.01* (1.07)	-0.149 (0.114)	0.952 (0.631)	
Female	-0.113 (0.553)	-0.125*** (0.047)	0.207 (0.160)	0.012 (0.011)	0.867** (0.364)	0.008 (0.022)	0.225* (0.136)	-0.041 (0.048)
Attended Top University	1.16* (0.663)	0.108 (0.071)	0.433** (0.198)	-0.023* (0.014)	0.004 (0.261)	-0.018 (0.028)	0.126 (0.109)	
Committee Leader	-0.850* (0.442)	0.080** (0.040)	0.994*** (0.129)	0.010 (0.010)	0.026 (0.277)	-0.002 (0.017)	-0.094 (0.103)	0.190*** (0.032)
Fraction Chair	-2.72** (1.10)	0.241* (0.134)	1.26*** (0.269)	0.040** (0.016)	-0.038 (0.401)	0.094*** (0.033)	-0.126 (0.144)	0.355*** (0.061)
SMD Deputy	0.916 (0.825)	-0.031 (0.061)	0.187 (0.181)	-0.047** (0.023)	-0.141 (0.715)	-0.075** (0.037)	-0.083 (0.240)	0.029 (0.052)
Years in Office	0.203*** (0.054)	-0.003 (0.005)	-0.002 (0.016)	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.011 (0.030)	-0.013*** (0.004)	-0.002 (0.009)	0.012*** (0.003)
Number of Votes (log)	-0.859 (1.09)	0.012 (0.052)	0.838*** (0.136)	-0.007 (0.042)	-0.454 (0.386)	0.897*** (0.027)	-0.117 (0.076)	-0.035 (0.043)
Celebrity	2.09** (0.875)	0.011 (0.062)	-0.918*** (0.234)	0.011 (0.022)	-0.103 (0.444)	0.012 (0.038)	0.123 (0.148)	0.120** (0.056)
Significant Business Interests	0.988* (0.513)	0.075 (0.057)	-0.564*** (0.167)	-0.007 (0.011)	0.233 (0.316)	0.006 (0.018)	0.207** (0.103)	0.099*** (0.036)
Ideal Point								-0.062*** (0.021)
Absenteeism (all)								0.004** (0.002)
Bills (ihs)								-0.049** (0.023)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.440	0.155	0.244	0.099	0.822	0.821	0.901	0.149
Observations	1,108	1,108	1,108	735	373	735	373	1,051
Party Subset	None	None	None	UR	Non-UR	UR	Non-UR	None
Oster's $\delta$ for $\beta = 0$	3.77	-8.89	2.66	5.68	2.07	-0.79	1.93	-17.81
Occupation fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Convocation fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

**Note:** \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1 This table shows the main results related to shirking, regime loyalty, and turnover in office using a continuous measure to identify kompromat deputies. This measure is the ratio of the total value of reported cars to the total family earnings the kompromat measure. The predictor shown has been winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile to reduce the effect of outliers. All models are estimated using OLS with standard errors clustered at the deputy level.

**TABLE D3: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS USING CHANGE IN INCOME RATHER THAN KOMPROMAT**

	Absenteeism (all)	Bills (ihs)	Questions (ihs)	Govt Bills (all)		Ideal Point		Re-elected
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Change in Income Over Term	-0.079 (0.161)	-0.008 (0.015)	-0.042 (0.042)	0.001 (0.004)	-0.115** (0.052)	-0.001 (0.007)	-0.058** (0.024)	-0.013 (0.010)
Deputy Income, First Year (log)	0.086 (0.169)	-0.015 (0.019)	-0.200*** (0.069)	0.0007 (0.003)	-0.074 (0.138)	0.0004 (0.006)	-0.057 (0.054)	0.056*** (0.013)
Family Real Estate Assets (ihs)	0.429 (0.302)	-0.003 (0.029)	-0.112 (0.108)	-0.006 (0.009)	0.060 (0.173)	0.017 (0.015)	0.036 (0.070)	-0.010 (0.022)
Ever Had Car Loan	0.590 (1.66)	-0.099 (0.078)	-0.367 (0.730)	0.037 (0.031)		-0.019 (0.050)		0.177 (0.159)
Age (log)	-0.637 (0.856)	-0.141 (0.089)	0.097 (0.280)	-0.010 (0.020)	-0.108 (0.544)	0.002 (0.037)	-0.118 (0.223)	-0.317*** (0.070)
Member: United Russia	-3.01*** (0.846)	-0.297*** (0.078)	-0.675*** (0.209)					0.643*** (0.139)
Member: Communist Party	2.83*** (0.987)	-0.099 (0.093)	-0.240 (0.273)		-3.88*** (0.271)		-3.69*** (0.107)	-0.089 (0.093)
Member: LDPR	15.0*** (1.24)	0.246* (0.135)	0.228 (0.290)		5.42*** (0.282)		1.47*** (0.107)	0.045 (0.069)
Died in Office	10.9** (5.23)	0.157 (0.206)	-0.598 (0.584)	-0.077** (0.038)	-0.359 (0.372)	-0.154 (0.106)	-0.558*** (0.144)	
Female	-0.565 (0.454)	-0.090* (0.047)	0.332** (0.143)	0.009 (0.012)	0.945*** (0.351)	0.037* (0.021)	0.279** (0.130)	-0.013 (0.039)
Attended Top University	0.915 (0.557)	0.086 (0.064)	0.374** (0.180)	-0.024* (0.013)	0.257 (0.237)	-0.002 (0.027)	0.140 (0.097)	
Committee Leader	-1.19*** (0.380)	0.129*** (0.035)	0.946*** (0.113)	0.013 (0.011)	0.082 (0.251)	0.027 (0.018)	-0.061 (0.096)	0.181*** (0.029)
Fraction Chair	-3.30*** (0.920)	0.206* (0.117)	1.29*** (0.274)	0.053*** (0.017)	-0.233 (0.384)	0.114*** (0.032)	-0.179 (0.141)	0.336*** (0.047)
SMD Deputy	1.05 (0.720)	0.015 (0.053)	0.122 (0.164)	-0.051* (0.026)	-0.466 (0.654)	-0.097** (0.039)	-0.267 (0.233)	0.022 (0.046)
Years in Office	0.206*** (0.047)	-0.002 (0.005)	0.004 (0.016)	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.013 (0.027)	-0.012*** (0.004)	0.0009 (0.009)	0.013*** (0.003)
Number of Votes (log)	2.96*** (0.763)	0.054 (0.058)	1.21*** (0.188)	-0.077*** (0.017)	0.362 (0.424)	0.892*** (0.028)	-0.278 (0.201)	0.063 (0.057)
Celebrity	1.73** (0.819)	0.029 (0.068)	-0.762*** (0.232)	0.012 (0.020)	-0.151 (0.371)	0.016 (0.036)	0.037 (0.142)	0.125** (0.054)
Significant Business Interests	0.724 (0.485)	0.041 (0.050)	-0.607*** (0.157)	0.0007 (0.012)	0.279 (0.294)	0.012 (0.019)	0.179* (0.102)	0.046 (0.034)
Ideal Point								-0.075*** (0.018)
Absenteeism (all)								0.005** (0.002)
Bills (ihs)								-0.020 (0.022)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.451	0.141	0.230	0.079	0.833	0.799	0.897	0.158
Observations	1,325	1,325	1,325	880	445	880	445	1,288
Party Subset	None	None	None	UR	Non-UR	UR	Non-UR	None
Oster's $\delta$ for $\beta = 0$	2.34	-6.23	6.76	5.29	2.37	-0.97	2.24	20.32
Occupation fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Convocation fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

**Note:** \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1 This table shows the main results related to shirking, regime loyalty, and turnover in office using change in deputy income over their time in convocation rather than the indicator used in the main text for kompromat. Change is calculated as a deputy's income in their first full year in office subtracted from their income in their last full year in office, divided by the first year income. The predictor shown has been winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile to reduce the effect of outliers. All models are estimated using OLS with standard errors clustered at the deputy level.

**TABLE D4: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS REMOVING ALL DEPUTIES WITH LOANS**

	Absenteeism (all)	Bills (ihs)	Questions (ihs)	Govt Bills (all)		Ideal Point		Re-elected
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Kompromat Deputy (without loans)	0.984** (0.453)	-0.078* (0.044)	-0.190 (0.149)	-0.025 (0.025)	0.684*** (0.217)	-0.026 (0.037)	0.242*** (0.088)	-0.111*** (0.032)
Family Real Estate Assets (ihs)	0.361 (0.332)	-0.017 (0.028)	-0.201* (0.103)	-0.002 (0.009)	0.016 (0.164)	0.004 (0.018)	-0.013 (0.065)	0.010 (0.021)
Ever Had Car Loan	0.411 (1.97)	-0.131 (0.085)	-0.331 (0.764)	0.042 (0.026)		-0.023 (0.048)		0.155 (0.163)
Age (log)	-0.118 (0.908)	-0.174** (0.086)	0.004 (0.272)	-0.029 (0.023)	0.087 (0.565)	0.012 (0.038)	0.068 (0.212)	-0.330*** (0.070)
Member: United Russia	-2.92*** (0.810)	-0.323*** (0.077)	-0.797*** (0.210)					0.568*** (0.133)
Member: Communist Party	3.29*** (0.980)	-0.138 (0.091)	-0.371 (0.275)		-3.76*** (0.258)		-3.56*** (0.101)	-0.044 (0.089)
Member: LDPR	14.6*** (1.16)	0.180 (0.129)	0.201 (0.284)		5.45*** (0.268)		1.47*** (0.099)	0.053 (0.063)
Died in Office	8.30*** (3.10)	-0.034 (0.127)	-0.923** (0.418)	-0.040 (0.028)	1.37* (0.700)	-0.151* (0.080)	0.905** (0.406)	
Female	-0.563 (0.458)	-0.117** (0.046)	0.353** (0.138)	0.012 (0.011)	0.790** (0.318)	0.025 (0.021)	0.249** (0.116)	-0.038 (0.038)
Attended Top University	1.08* (0.571)	0.070 (0.061)	0.317* (0.178)	-0.024* (0.013)	0.204 (0.226)	-0.009 (0.025)	0.150 (0.092)	
Committee Leader	-0.710* (0.387)	0.096*** (0.035)	0.860*** (0.110)	0.011 (0.009)	0.290 (0.236)	0.017 (0.016)	-0.002 (0.089)	0.194*** (0.028)
Fraction Chair	-2.86*** (0.827)	0.201* (0.109)	1.31*** (0.243)	0.046*** (0.017)	-0.171 (0.341)	0.108*** (0.031)	-0.102 (0.117)	0.332*** (0.050)
SMD Deputy	1.03 (0.730)	-0.026 (0.052)	0.174 (0.160)	-0.049** (0.025)	-0.463 (0.630)	-0.096*** (0.037)	-0.266 (0.217)	0.018 (0.045)
Years in Office	0.178*** (0.047)	-0.002 (0.004)	0.008 (0.015)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.008 (0.025)	-0.013*** (0.003)	-0.004 (0.008)	0.013*** (0.003)
Number of Votes (log)	-0.823 (0.963)	0.036 (0.042)	0.943*** (0.115)	-0.019 (0.034)	-0.718** (0.330)	0.898*** (0.023)	-0.416*** (0.123)	-0.026 (0.038)
Celebrity	1.85** (0.755)	0.034 (0.067)	-0.822*** (0.223)	0.020 (0.021)	-0.178 (0.393)	0.013 (0.035)	0.053 (0.131)	0.127** (0.052)
Significant Business Interests	1.07** (0.462)	0.036 (0.050)	-0.708*** (0.155)	0.003 (0.011)	0.220 (0.273)	0.012 (0.018)	0.187* (0.096)	0.075** (0.032)
Ideal Point								-0.064*** (0.018)
Absenteeism (all)								0.005** (0.002)
Bills (ihs)								-0.039* (0.022)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.433	0.134	0.231	0.079	0.825	0.799	0.893	0.141
Observations	1,414	1,414	1,414	927	487	927	487	1,344
Party Subset	None	None	None	UR	Non-UR	UR	Non-UR	None
Oster's $\delta$ for $\beta = 0$	3.77	-8.89	2.66	5.68	2.07	-0.79	1.93	-17.81
Occupation fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Convocation fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

**Note:** \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1 This table shows the main results related to shirking, regime loyalty, and turnover in office but labelling all deputies who ever took out a car loan (see Appendix Section B) as not being corrupt. This conservative approach acknowledges that some deputies may be using loans to purchase cars, thus reducing the validity of the income-based red flag. All models are estimated using OLS with standard errors clustered at the deputy level.

## E Robustness Checks: Subsets and Interactions

TABLE E1: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS WITH GENDER INTERACTIONS

	Absenteeism (all) (1)	Bills (ihs) (2)	Questions (ihs) (3)	Govt Bills (all) (4) (5)		Ideal Point (6) (7)		Re-elected (8)
Female	-0.621 (0.482)	-0.121** (0.050)	0.337** (0.149)	0.005 (0.011)	0.554* (0.316)	0.024 (0.021)	0.161 (0.118)	-0.031 (0.041)
Kompromat Deputy	0.979** (0.479)	-0.080* (0.047)	-0.202 (0.159)	-0.030 (0.026)	0.572*** (0.213)	-0.027 (0.040)	0.200** (0.089)	-0.109*** (0.033)
Family Real Estate Assets (ihs)	0.360 (0.332)	-0.017 (0.028)	-0.200* (0.103)	-0.002 (0.009)	0.016 (0.164)	0.004 (0.018)	-0.013 (0.065)	0.010 (0.021)
Ever Had Car Loan	0.115 (1.94)	-0.107 (0.091)	-0.271 (0.764)	0.051* (0.030)		-0.015 (0.051)		0.188 (0.156)
Age (log)	-0.091 (0.914)	-0.173** (0.087)	0.009 (0.273)	-0.025 (0.023)	-0.022 (0.560)	0.012 (0.037)	0.028 (0.211)	-0.333*** (0.070)
Member: United Russia	-2.92*** (0.811)	-0.323*** (0.077)	-0.797*** (0.210)					0.568*** (0.133)
Member: Communist Party	3.29*** (0.980)	-0.138 (0.091)	-0.371 (0.275)		-3.73*** (0.256)		-3.55*** (0.101)	-0.044 (0.089)
Member: LDPR	14.6*** (1.17)	0.181 (0.129)	0.203 (0.285)		5.46*** (0.268)		1.47*** (0.099)	0.052 (0.063)
Died in Office	8.30*** (3.10)	-0.034 (0.127)	-0.921** (0.418)	-0.039 (0.028)	1.36** (0.680)	-0.151* (0.080)	0.902** (0.401)	
Attended Top University	1.09* (0.571)	0.070 (0.061)	0.317* (0.178)	-0.024* (0.013)	0.195 (0.226)	-0.009 (0.025)	0.147 (0.092)	
Committee Leader	-0.703* (0.388)	0.096*** (0.035)	0.860*** (0.111)	0.011 (0.009)	0.287 (0.235)	0.017 (0.016)	-0.004 (0.088)	0.194*** (0.028)
Fraction Chair	-2.86*** (0.827)	0.201* (0.110)	1.31*** (0.243)	0.046*** (0.017)	-0.164 (0.338)	0.108*** (0.031)	-0.099 (0.117)	0.333*** (0.050)
SMD Deputy	1.02 (0.730)	-0.026 (0.052)	0.174 (0.160)	-0.049** (0.025)	-0.440 (0.626)	-0.096*** (0.037)	-0.258 (0.215)	0.018 (0.045)
Years in Office	0.178*** (0.047)	-0.002 (0.004)	0.008 (0.015)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.003 (0.025)	-0.013*** (0.003)	-0.002 (0.008)	0.013*** (0.003)
Number of Votes (log)	-0.826 (0.963)	0.036 (0.042)	0.943*** (0.116)	-0.018 (0.034)	-0.737** (0.331)	0.898*** (0.023)	-0.423*** (0.122)	-0.025 (0.038)
Celebrity	1.85** (0.756)	0.035 (0.067)	-0.822*** (0.223)	0.020 (0.021)	-0.142 (0.383)	0.013 (0.035)	0.066 (0.129)	0.127** (0.052)
Significant Business Interests	1.07** (0.462)	0.036 (0.050)	-0.708*** (0.155)	0.003 (0.011)	0.243 (0.274)	0.012 (0.018)	0.195** (0.096)	0.074** (0.032)
Female × Kompromat Deputy	0.486 (1.23)	0.027 (0.097)	0.126 (0.363)	0.054* (0.030)	2.17 (1.32)	0.007 (0.045)	0.808** (0.365)	-0.067 (0.094)
Ideal Point								-0.064*** (0.018)
Absenteeism (all)								0.005** (0.002)
Bills (ihs)								-0.039* (0.022)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.433	0.134	0.231	0.081	0.826	0.799	0.894	0.141
Observations	1,414	1,414	1,414	927	487	927	487	1,344
Party Subset	None	None	None	UR	Non-UR	UR	Non-UR	None
Oster's $\delta$ for $\beta = 0$	3.87	-8.75	2.59	5.62	2.09	-0.79	1.94	-17.51
Occupation fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Convocation fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

**Note:** \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1 This table shows the main results on shirking and loyalty with the kompromat measure interacted with whether the deputy is female. All models are estimated using OLS with standard errors clustered at the deputy level.

**TABLE E2: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS WITH CONVOCAATION INTERACTIONS**

	Absenteeism (all)	Bills (ihs)	Questions (ihs)	Govt Bills (all)	Ideal Point		Re-elected	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
6th Conv.	0.054 (0.557)	0.065* (0.038)	-0.175 (0.120)	0.011 (0.012)	7.51*** (0.363)	0.281*** (0.019)	2.94*** (0.145)	0.017 (0.048)
7th Conv.	3.54*** (0.833)	0.097* (0.054)	0.143 (0.168)	0.145*** (0.024)	6.91*** (0.568)	-0.966*** (0.034)	0.399** (0.199)	-0.094** (0.046)
Kompromat Deputy	2.37*** (0.807)	-0.076 (0.050)	-0.058 (0.197)	0.035*** (0.012)	1.99*** (0.569)	0.043** (0.017)	0.665*** (0.219)	-0.106** (0.051)
Family Real Estate Assets (ihs)	0.343 (0.332)	-0.016 (0.028)	-0.196* (0.103)	-0.001 (0.009)	0.034 (0.165)	0.005 (0.018)	-0.005 (0.065)	0.011 (0.021)
Ever Had Car Loan	0.098 (1.91)	-0.100 (0.094)	-0.213 (0.766)	0.069 (0.043)		0.008 (0.062)		0.193 (0.156)
Age (log)	-0.266 (0.904)	-0.173** (0.087)	-0.003 (0.272)	-0.034 (0.023)	-0.020 (0.566)	0.006 (0.040)	0.039 (0.210)	-0.331*** (0.071)
Member: United Russia	-2.92*** (0.806)	-0.323*** (0.077)	-0.795*** (0.209)					0.570*** (0.134)
Member: Communist Party	3.34*** (0.979)	-0.138 (0.092)	-0.362 (0.275)		-3.72*** (0.255)		-3.55*** (0.100)	-0.045 (0.090)
Member: LDPR	14.6*** (1.16)	0.180 (0.129)	0.199 (0.283)		5.43*** (0.270)		1.46*** (0.099)	0.053 (0.063)
Died in Office	8.15*** (3.14)	-0.035 (0.127)	-0.945** (0.419)	-0.048 (0.029)	1.24* (0.728)	-0.160** (0.072)	0.853** (0.409)	
Female	-0.558 (0.458)	-0.117** (0.046)	0.354** (0.138)	0.012 (0.011)	0.747** (0.311)	0.025 (0.021)	0.235** (0.114)	-0.038 (0.038)
Attended Top University	1.07* (0.572)	0.070 (0.061)	0.317* (0.178)	-0.024* (0.013)	0.194 (0.227)	-0.009 (0.025)	0.148 (0.092)	
Committee Leader	-0.723* (0.385)	0.097*** (0.035)	0.864*** (0.111)	0.013 (0.010)	0.285 (0.235)	0.020 (0.017)	-0.005 (0.089)	0.194*** (0.028)
Fraction Chair	-2.77*** (0.833)	0.200* (0.110)	1.31*** (0.241)	0.050*** (0.017)	-0.226 (0.335)	0.111*** (0.033)	-0.121 (0.118)	0.332*** (0.050)
SMD Deputy	1.04 (0.732)	-0.027 (0.052)	0.169 (0.160)	-0.050** (0.025)	-0.461 (0.621)	-0.098*** (0.037)	-0.266 (0.212)	0.018 (0.045)
Years in Office	0.181*** (0.046)	-0.002 (0.004)	0.009 (0.015)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.025)	-0.012*** (0.003)	-0.002 (0.008)	0.013*** (0.003)
Number of Votes (log)	-0.802 (0.944)	0.035 (0.042)	0.939*** (0.115)	-0.023 (0.034)	-0.683** (0.332)	0.892*** (0.024)	-0.405*** (0.131)	-0.025 (0.038)
Celebrity	1.83** (0.764)	0.034 (0.067)	-0.825*** (0.223)	0.020 (0.021)	-0.156 (0.400)	0.013 (0.035)	0.055 (0.131)	0.127** (0.052)
Significant Business Interests	1.10** (0.460)	0.035 (0.050)	-0.708*** (0.154)	0.003 (0.011)	0.213 (0.269)	0.013 (0.018)	0.185* (0.095)	0.075** (0.032)
6th Conv. × Kompromat Deputy	-3.06** (1.21)	0.025 (0.082)	-0.060 (0.226)	-0.051** (0.022)	-2.02*** (0.624)	-0.054 (0.060)	-0.612** (0.241)	-0.004 (0.073)
7th Conv. × Kompromat Deputy	-1.04 (1.36)	-0.042 (0.083)	-0.456 (0.287)	-0.166** (0.084)	-1.72* (0.988)	-0.194* (0.114)	-0.658* (0.373)	-0.029 (0.082)
Ideal Point								-0.064*** (0.018)
Absenteeism (all)								0.005** (0.002)
Bills (ihs)								-0.039* (0.022)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.436	0.135	0.232	0.105	0.829	0.802	0.895	0.141
Observations	1,414	1,414	1,414	927	487	927	487	1,344
Party Subset	None	None	None	UR	Non-UR	UR	Non-UR	None
Oster's $\delta$ for $\beta = 0$	3.52	-9.11	2.52	6.02	2.18	-0.81	2	-18.43
Occupation fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

**Note:** \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1 This table shows the main results on shirking and loyalty with the kompromat measure interacted with the convocation being analyzed. All models are estimated using OLS with standard errors clustered at the deputy level.

**TABLE E3: REGIME SUPPORT AND CORRUPTION, BROKEN OUT BY CONVOCAATION**

	Govt Bills (all)			Ideal Point			Govt Bills (close)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Kompromat Deputy	0.238 (0.263)	-0.010 (0.139)	0.603 (0.410)	0.060 (0.095)	0.024 (0.079)	0.103 (0.098)	1.25 (1.17)	0.657 (1.23)	1.68 (1.53)
Family Real Estate Assets (ihs)	-0.106 (0.123)	0.093 (0.157)	-0.013 (0.241)	0.013 (0.044)	-0.063 (0.073)	0.056 (0.052)	0.187 (0.458)	-1.43 (0.942)	-0.890 (0.822)
Age (log)	-0.019 (0.541)	-0.263 (0.644)	-0.255 (0.641)	-0.044 (0.228)	0.059 (0.255)	0.111 (0.185)	0.197 (2.16)	2.11 (2.61)	3.06 (2.76)
Member: Communist Party	-8.98*** (0.266)	-3.30*** (0.203)	1.37*** (0.326)	-5.65*** (0.129)	-3.20*** (0.115)	-1.85*** (0.114)	-48.1*** (0.972)	-19.1*** (1.86)	-9.52*** (1.66)
Member: LDPR	6.48*** (0.289)	5.18*** (0.220)	5.56*** (0.585)	1.62*** (0.103)	1.68*** (0.105)	1.25*** (0.104)	19.4*** (1.08)	44.4*** (1.82)	11.6*** (1.79)
Female	0.634* (0.334)	0.097 (0.221)	0.334 (0.273)	0.185* (0.100)	-0.093 (0.105)	0.013 (0.159)	2.70** (1.31)	0.180 (1.85)	0.605 (1.32)
Attended Top University	-0.485* (0.267)	0.053 (0.206)	-0.056 (0.282)	-0.068 (0.070)	0.093 (0.110)	-0.012 (0.090)	-1.61 (1.10)	-0.170 (1.67)	-1.93 (1.33)
Committee Leader	-0.043 (0.176)	-0.038 (0.168)	0.586 (0.547)	0.009 (0.066)	-0.153 (0.101)	0.107 (0.106)	-1.12 (0.788)	-2.21* (1.18)	0.438 (1.05)
Fraction Chair	-1.01* (0.592)	0.059 (0.233)	0.427 (0.358)	-0.120 (0.126)	-0.028 (0.093)	-0.090 (0.148)	-4.44* (2.49)	-0.421 (1.71)	1.17 (1.51)
Years in Office	-0.015 (0.017)	0.016 (0.021)	-0.029 (0.049)	-0.011 (0.008)	-0.002 (0.008)	-0.004 (0.007)	0.024 (0.068)	0.014 (0.107)	-0.118* (0.071)
Number of Votes (log)	-1.07*** (0.371)	0.595 (0.371)	-0.769 (0.504)	-0.348 (0.309)	-0.300** (0.128)	-0.653*** (0.132)	-4.19** (1.73)	5.48** (2.19)	-6.59** (2.65)
Celebrity	-0.926 (0.652)	-0.269 (0.550)	0.147 (0.574)	-0.038 (0.149)	0.099 (0.230)	-0.042 (0.185)	-3.62 (2.58)	0.893 (3.09)	-1.56 (1.80)
Significant Business Interests	-0.035 (0.191)	0.255 (0.191)	-0.567 (0.767)	0.0006 (0.099)	0.251** (0.104)	-0.068 (0.107)	0.407 (0.732)	3.38** (1.56)	-2.64 (1.76)
SMD Deputy			0.135 (0.293)			-0.057 (0.101)			-0.363 (1.63)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.978	0.903	0.703	0.979	0.923	0.946	0.981	0.915	0.810
Observations	139	232	116	139	232	116	139	232	116
Convocation(s)	5	6	7	5	6	7	5	6	7
Party Subset	Non-UR	Non-UR	Non-UR	Non-UR	Non-UR	Non-UR	Non-UR	Non-UR	Non-UR
Oster's $\delta$ for $\beta = 0$	0.38	0.38	0.38	0.91	0.91	0.91	1.5	1.5	1.5
Occupation fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

**Note:** \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1 This table shows the main results on shirking and loyalty with the kompromat measure interacted with the convocation being analyzed. All models are estimated using OLS with standard errors clustered at the deputy level.

**TABLE E4: CORRUPTION AND REGIME LOYALTY: PARTY HETEROGENEITY, CLOSE VOTES**

	Govt Bills (all, close)		Govt Bills (1st, close)		Govt Bills (2nd, close)		Govt Bills (3rd, close)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Komproamat Deputy	-0.403 (0.302)	3.01** (1.23)	-0.541 (0.402)	3.01** (1.22)	-0.299 (0.207)	2.97* (1.52)	-0.448 (0.336)	2.77** (1.30)
Family Real Estate Assets (ihs)	-0.021 (0.092)	-0.619 (0.776)	0.007 (0.117)	-0.931 (0.807)	0.021 (0.064)	-0.910 (0.992)	0.024 (0.097)	-0.669 (0.863)
Ever Had Car Loan	0.624** (0.268)		0.493 (0.330)		0.203 (0.168)		0.460 (0.298)	
Age (log)	-0.115 (0.137)	1.75 (2.65)	-0.124 (0.149)	1.85 (2.98)	-0.111 (0.081)	0.342 (3.53)	-0.199 (0.137)	1.53 (2.99)
Died in Office	-0.177 (0.336)	7.60 (5.30)	0.073 (0.482)	9.89* (5.12)	0.192 (0.153)	9.54 (6.87)	0.355 (0.344)	8.99 (6.06)
Female	0.030 (0.083)	2.77* (1.53)	0.032 (0.103)	3.00* (1.65)	0.016 (0.054)	4.20** (1.96)	0.065 (0.083)	3.01* (1.79)
Attended Top University	-0.065 (0.113)	-0.541 (1.32)	-0.040 (0.145)	0.147 (1.36)	-0.004 (0.075)	-0.844 (1.67)	0.017 (0.118)	-0.042 (1.39)
Committee Leader	0.045 (0.074)	-0.356 (1.16)	0.022 (0.093)	0.321 (1.28)	0.054 (0.051)	-1.16 (1.47)	0.047 (0.079)	-0.090 (1.33)
Fraction Chair	0.297 (0.192)	-0.678 (1.65)	0.409* (0.246)	0.891 (1.70)	0.167 (0.129)	-1.04 (2.20)	0.314 (0.202)	-1.17 (1.92)
SMD Deputy	-0.483 (0.304)	-1.90 (3.58)	-0.563 (0.406)	-2.31 (3.94)	-0.300 (0.208)	-2.32 (3.90)	-0.459 (0.337)	-2.00 (3.68)
Years in Office	-0.026 (0.031)	-0.040 (0.105)	-0.044 (0.043)	-0.132 (0.128)	-0.021 (0.021)	-0.006 (0.115)	-0.032 (0.036)	-0.055 (0.113)
Number of Votes (log)	-0.276** (0.137)	-1.15 (1.83)	-0.074 (0.140)	2.40 (1.95)	-0.092 (0.057)	4.50* (2.57)	0.181 (0.292)	0.179 (2.09)
Celebrity	0.303 (0.233)	0.550 (1.74)	0.424 (0.307)	1.63 (1.64)	0.185 (0.154)	0.445 (1.80)	0.267 (0.264)	1.10 (1.97)
Significant Business Interests	-0.017 (0.119)	1.34 (1.33)	0.036 (0.157)	1.06 (1.42)	0.007 (0.082)	0.961 (1.56)	-0.077 (0.131)	1.44 (1.41)
Member: Communist Party		-24.8*** (1.40)		-28.3*** (1.50)		-25.5*** (1.64)		-26.6*** (1.57)
Member: LDPR		28.0*** (1.46)		28.7*** (1.54)		34.0*** (1.94)		26.7*** (1.59)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.055	0.812	0.036	0.819	0.032	0.767	0.043	0.789
Observations	927	487	927	485	927	483	927	486
Party Subset	UR	Non-UR	UR	Non-UR	UR	Non-UR	UR	Non-UR
Oster's $\delta$ for $\beta = 0$	-50.14	0.97	-8.83	0.97	-14.71	0.67	-9.72	0.75
Convocation fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Occupation fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

**Note:** \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1 This table shows results using different measures of loyalty to the regime as the outcome variables. Only votes on government-initiated bills which received less than 90% are included. The Govt Bills column measures the percentage of government-initiated bills that deputies voted for during the convocation, either altogether (Columns 1-2) or broken out into 1st, 2nd or 3rd readings. The reference category for the party member predictors is Just Russia. All models are estimated using OLS with standard errors clustered at the deputy level.

## F Robustness Checks: Mechanisms and Re-election

**TABLE F1: CORRUPTION AND LOBBYING**

	Lobbies for Federal Gov			Lobbies for Regional Gov			Lobbies for Other Org		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Kompromat Deputy	0.033 (0.046)	0.016 (0.054)	0.080 (0.094)	0.033 (0.046)	0.016 (0.054)	0.080 (0.094)	0.005 (0.034)	-0.001 (0.034)	0.046 (0.087)
Family Real Estate Assets (ihs)	0.007 (0.026)	-0.005 (0.029)	0.081 (0.055)	0.007 (0.026)	-0.005 (0.029)	0.081 (0.055)	-0.034** (0.017)	-0.024 (0.020)	-0.049 (0.042)
Ever Had Car Loan	-0.138*** (0.043)	-0.148*** (0.055)		-0.138*** (0.043)	-0.148*** (0.055)		-0.059 (0.045)	-0.067 (0.045)	
Age (log)	-0.037 (0.081)	-0.107 (0.097)	0.168 (0.142)	-0.037 (0.081)	-0.107 (0.097)	0.168 (0.142)	-0.085 (0.065)	-0.072 (0.075)	-0.198 (0.160)
Member: United Russia	0.115 (0.071)			0.115 (0.071)			-0.048 (0.070)		
Member: Communist Party	0.007 (0.077)		-0.032 (0.085)	0.007 (0.077)		-0.032 (0.085)	-0.120 (0.079)		-0.161* (0.095)
Member: LDPR	0.032 (0.087)		0.039 (0.093)	0.032 (0.087)		0.039 (0.093)	0.012 (0.089)		-0.053 (0.099)
Female	0.035 (0.046)	0.029 (0.050)	-0.034 (0.089)	0.035 (0.046)	0.029 (0.050)	-0.034 (0.089)	-0.013 (0.033)	0.0006 (0.038)	-0.124** (0.061)
Committee Leader	0.102*** (0.038)	0.125*** (0.048)	0.060 (0.050)	0.102*** (0.038)	0.125*** (0.048)	0.060 (0.050)	-0.015 (0.030)	0.007 (0.033)	-0.063 (0.066)
Fraction Chair	0.033 (0.082)	0.036 (0.147)	-0.006 (0.075)	0.033 (0.082)	0.036 (0.147)	-0.006 (0.075)	0.069 (0.084)	0.051 (0.122)	0.060 (0.134)
SMD Deputy	-0.085*** (0.032)	-0.095** (0.039)	-0.032 (0.060)	-0.085*** (0.032)	-0.095** (0.039)	-0.032 (0.060)	-0.046* (0.025)	-0.037 (0.029)	-0.106* (0.055)
Years in Office	0.003 (0.003)	0.005 (0.004)	-0.007 (0.005)	0.003 (0.003)	0.005 (0.004)	-0.007 (0.005)	0.006** (0.003)	0.005** (0.002)	0.008 (0.007)
Number of Votes (log)	0.091*** (0.027)	0.109*** (0.037)	0.062 (0.040)	0.091*** (0.027)	0.109*** (0.037)	0.062 (0.040)	0.127*** (0.031)	0.097*** (0.034)	0.183*** (0.059)
Celebrity	-0.003 (0.058)	-0.085 (0.061)	0.282* (0.149)	-0.003 (0.058)	-0.085 (0.061)	0.282* (0.149)	-0.021 (0.056)	-0.048 (0.058)	0.104 (0.133)
Significant Business Interests	0.041 (0.036)	0.056 (0.043)	-0.097 (0.072)	0.041 (0.036)	0.056 (0.043)	-0.097 (0.072)	-0.020 (0.031)	-0.028 (0.032)	-0.017 (0.088)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.071	0.088	0.198	0.071	0.088	0.198	0.106	0.102	0.184
Observations	470	354	116	470	354	116	470	354	116
Party Subset	All	UR	Non-UR	All	UR	Non-UR	All	UR	Non-UR
Convocation fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Occupation fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

**Note:** \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1 This table examines whether deputies in the 7th convocation were classified by TI-Russia as lobbying for the interests of other federal government agencies not working in security (Columns 1-3), the interests of regional governments (Columns 4-6), and the interests of non-government organizations such as churches, unions, and environmental groups (Columns 7-9). For each outcome, results are shown first using all deputies and then broken out by ruling party or systemic opposition. All models are estimated using OLS with standard errors clustered at the deputy level.

**TABLE F2: CORRUPTION AND DEPUTY REQUESTS**

	Publicly Shares Deputy Requests	
	(1)	(2)
Kompromat Deputy	-0.054*	-0.051*
	(0.030)	(0.029)
Family Real Estate Assets (ihs)	0.008	0.010
	(0.024)	(0.023)
Ever Had Car Loan	-0.095***	-0.092***
	(0.036)	(0.035)
Age (log)	-0.165**	-0.160**
	(0.071)	(0.071)
Member: United Russia	0.048	-0.029
	(0.052)	(0.127)
Member: Communist Party	0.057	0.041
	(0.059)	(0.078)
Member: LDPR	-0.004	-0.067
	(0.057)	(0.109)
Female	0.001	0.003
	(0.040)	(0.042)
Committee Leader	0.024	0.017
	(0.033)	(0.034)
Fraction Chair	0.057	0.042
	(0.066)	(0.071)
SMD Deputy	0.034	0.032
	(0.029)	(0.030)
Years in Office	-0.002	-0.002
	(0.003)	(0.003)
Number of Votes (log)	0.038	0.035
	(0.039)	(0.042)
Celebrity	-0.035	-0.034
	(0.040)	(0.042)
Significant Business Interests	0.020	0.020
	(0.039)	(0.039)
Govt Bills (all)		0.010
		(0.010)
Absenteeism (all)		-0.0003
		(0.002)
Bills (ihs)		0.038
		(0.027)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.059	0.065
Observations	430	430
Occupation fixed effects	✓	✓

**Note:** \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1 This table examines whether deputies in the 7th convocation had subpages on their personal websites on www.duma.gov.ru that make available their deputy requests in PDF form. The sample is limited to only deputies serving in the 7th convocation who were in office on January 27, 2021 when the new site format was introduced and encouraged by Chairman Volodin. All models are estimated using OLS with standard errors clustered at the deputy level.

**TABLE F3: CORRUPTION AND RE-ELECTION, PARTY HETEROGENEITY**

	Ran for Re-election		Re-elected	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Kompromat Deputy	-0.122*** (0.038)	-0.080* (0.044)	-0.137*** (0.037)	-0.098** (0.049)
Family Real Estate Assets (ihs)	0.035 (0.026)	0.007 (0.026)	0.007 (0.028)	0.003 (0.030)
Ever Had Car Loan	0.060 (0.157)		0.179 (0.155)	
Age (log)	-0.343*** (0.079)	-0.305*** (0.101)	-0.336*** (0.082)	-0.285** (0.116)
Female	0.035 (0.043)	-0.130** (0.060)	-0.032 (0.042)	-0.138** (0.066)
Committee Leader	0.223*** (0.035)	0.186*** (0.037)	0.198*** (0.036)	0.236*** (0.044)
Fraction Chair	0.235*** (0.082)	0.110** (0.046)	0.353*** (0.071)	0.248*** (0.074)
SMD Deputy	-0.075 (0.052)	0.064 (0.086)	-0.016 (0.051)	0.020 (0.105)
Years in Office	0.008** (0.003)	-0.001 (0.004)	0.014*** (0.003)	0.011*** (0.004)
Number of Votes (log)	0.049 (0.064)	-0.005 (0.030)	0.042 (0.066)	-0.027 (0.036)
Celebrity	0.049 (0.060)	0.119* (0.069)	0.080 (0.064)	0.235*** (0.072)
Significant Business Interests	0.086** (0.037)	-0.041 (0.046)	0.065* (0.037)	0.081 (0.052)
Govt Bills (all)	-0.098 (0.080)	0.016** (0.007)	-0.156** (0.070)	0.035*** (0.008)
Absenteeism (all)	0.008** (0.004)	-0.008*** (0.002)	0.006* (0.004)	-0.008*** (0.002)
Bills (ihs)	-0.016 (0.037)	0.0006 (0.021)	-0.027 (0.037)	-0.003 (0.026)
Member: Communist Party		0.108* (0.058)		0.355*** (0.063)
Member: LDPR		-0.113* (0.063)		-0.087 (0.069)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.125	0.166	0.135	0.325
Observations	918	482	918	482
Party Subset	UR	Non-UR	UR	Non-UR
Oster's $\delta$ for $\beta = 0$	8477.28	20.64	-21.66	-399.61
Convocation fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Occupation fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓

**Note:** \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1 This table looks at deputy re-election rates broken out by whether the deputy was a member of the ruling party (Columns 1 and 3) or the non-systemic opposition (Columns 2 and 4). The reference category for the party member predictors is Just Russia. All models are estimated using OLS with standard errors clustered at the deputy level.

**TABLE F4: CORRUPTION AND RE-ELECTION, MECHANISMS**

	(1)	Re-elected		(4)
		(2)	(3)	
Kompromat Deputy	-0.076 (0.050)	-0.051 (0.121)	-0.107*** (0.031)	-0.114*** (0.035)
Years in Office	0.014*** (0.003)	0.013*** (0.003)	0.014*** (0.003)	0.013*** (0.003)
Family Real Estate Assets (ihs)	0.013 (0.021)	0.018 (0.024)	0.012 (0.021)	0.013 (0.021)
Ever Had Car Loan	0.169 (0.159)	0.178 (0.156)	0.182 (0.157)	0.175 (0.157)
Age (log)	-0.339*** (0.070)	-0.339*** (0.070)	-0.337*** (0.070)	-0.341*** (0.070)
Member: United Russia	0.391*** (0.078)	0.391*** (0.078)	0.402*** (0.148)	0.391*** (0.078)
Member: Communist Party	0.072 (0.065)	0.076 (0.064)	0.069 (0.101)	0.074 (0.064)
Member: LDPR	0.134* (0.069)	0.138** (0.070)	0.135* (0.070)	0.136* (0.069)
Female	-0.042 (0.038)	-0.040 (0.037)	-0.041 (0.037)	-0.040 (0.037)
Committee Leader	0.201*** (0.028)	0.202*** (0.028)	0.200*** (0.028)	0.201*** (0.028)
Fraction Chair	0.335*** (0.051)	0.333*** (0.050)	0.335*** (0.050)	0.332*** (0.050)
SMD Deputy	$6.85 \times 10^{-5}$ (0.046)	0.003 (0.046)	0.002 (0.046)	0.002 (0.046)
Number of Votes (log)	-0.045 (0.037)	-0.044 (0.037)	-0.044 (0.038)	-0.044 (0.037)
Celebrity	0.126** (0.051)	0.124** (0.052)	0.127** (0.051)	0.123** (0.051)
Significant Business Interests	0.071** (0.032)	0.072** (0.032)	0.072** (0.032)	0.071** (0.032)
Govt Bills (all)	-0.030*** (0.007)	-0.030*** (0.007)	-0.030** (0.011)	-0.030*** (0.007)
Absenteeism (all)	0.004** (0.002)	0.004** (0.002)	0.004** (0.002)	0.004** (0.002)
Bills (ihs)	-0.036* (0.022)	-0.037* (0.022)	-0.035 (0.022)	-0.040* (0.024)
Kompromat Deputy × Years in Office	-0.006 (0.007)			
Kompromat Deputy × Family Real Estate Assets (ihs)		-0.023 (0.048)		
Ideal Point			-0.0002 (0.030)	
Kompromat Deputy × Ideal Point			-0.011 (0.008)	
Kompromat Deputy × Bills (ihs)				0.019 (0.055)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.147	0.147	0.148	0.147
Observations	1,344	1,344	1,344	1,344
Occupation fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Convocation fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓

**Note:** \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1 This table looks at deputy post-convocation career outcomes, with the main corruption measure interacted with other deputy characteristics. All models are estimated using OLS with standard errors clustered at the deputy level.

**TABLE F5: CORRUPTION AND POST-DUMA CAREERS**

	Found Another Job		Worked Again in Gov.	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Kompromat Deputy	0.103** (0.043)	0.082* (0.044)	-0.002 (0.059)	-0.004 (0.060)
Family Real Estate Assets (ihs)	0.018 (0.027)	0.036 (0.027)	0.037 (0.036)	0.047 (0.037)
Member: United Russia	0.186 (0.207)	0.179 (0.203)	-0.185 (0.326)	-0.178 (0.325)
Member: Communist Party	-0.111 (0.124)	-0.075 (0.122)	0.310* (0.187)	0.308* (0.185)
Member: LDPR	0.030 (0.094)	-0.035 (0.096)	0.109 (0.145)	0.081 (0.143)
Female	0.013 (0.048)	0.001 (0.048)	0.031 (0.076)	0.027 (0.076)
Committee Leader	-0.0006 (0.040)	0.002 (0.039)	0.008 (0.067)	0.007 (0.067)
Fraction Chair	0.083 (0.122)	0.092 (0.124)	-0.145 (0.162)	-0.128 (0.155)
SMD Deputy	0.076 (0.051)	0.081 (0.050)	-0.092 (0.123)	-0.081 (0.121)
Years in Office	-0.006 (0.004)	-0.0006 (0.004)	0.009 (0.006)	0.011 (0.007)
Number of Votes (log)	-0.267*** (0.068)	-0.257*** (0.068)	-0.179** (0.082)	-0.176** (0.083)
Celebrity	0.188** (0.080)	0.146* (0.080)	-0.213* (0.127)	-0.231* (0.129)
Significant Business Interests	0.015 (0.042)	-0.013 (0.042)	-0.032 (0.069)	-0.043 (0.071)
Ideal Point	-0.029 (0.029)	-0.025 (0.028)	0.040 (0.048)	0.038 (0.048)
Absenteeism (all)	0.001 (0.003)	0.002 (0.003)	-0.005 (0.004)	-0.005 (0.004)
Bills (ihs)	0.023 (0.030)	0.010 (0.030)	0.037 (0.049)	0.033 (0.048)
Age (log)		-0.356*** (0.095)		-0.176 (0.157)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.101	0.120	0.107	0.114
Observations	707	707	225	225
Occupation fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Convocation fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓


**Note:** \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1 This table looks at deputy post-convocation career outcomes. Columns 1 and 2 use as an outcome whether the deputy ever worked again after leaving the Duma in a formal position based on data from RuPEP, a database of biographical information for Russian elites. Columns 3 and 4 code up all positions for deputies who did find a job after leaving the duma, with the outcome being an indicator for whether that job was in any governmental position (federal, regional, or municipal). All models are estimated using OLS with standard errors clustered at the deputy level.

**TABLE F6: DEPUTY ACCOUNTABILITY**

	Elected (SMD)		List Number (PR)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Kompromat Deputy	-0.047 (0.044)	-0.047 (0.045)	-0.120 (0.259)	-0.155 (0.261)
Family Real Estate Assets (ihs)	0.015 (0.032)	0.017 (0.032)	0.054 (0.156)	0.038 (0.155)
Ever Had Car Loan	0.106** (0.048)	0.108** (0.044)	-2.46*** (0.306)	-2.30*** (0.329)
Age (log)	-0.056 (0.082)	-0.053 (0.084)	-0.382 (0.591)	-0.303 (0.589)
Member: United Russia	0.721*** (0.069)	0.455*** (0.164)	2.77*** (0.256)	1.79*** (0.483)
Member: Communist Party	-0.012 (0.080)	0.086 (0.097)	0.411 (0.288)	0.826** (0.358)
Member: LDPR	-0.023 (0.077)	-0.189 (0.133)	-0.441 (0.305)	-1.13*** (0.379)
Female	0.094 (0.058)	0.085 (0.058)	0.145 (0.343)	0.136 (0.346)
Committee Leader	0.048 (0.033)	0.036 (0.033)	0.161 (0.204)	0.077 (0.204)
Fraction Chair	0.078 (0.106)	0.077 (0.110)	-1.03*** (0.289)	-1.06*** (0.288)
Years in Office	0.011** (0.005)	0.012** (0.005)	-0.064*** (0.021)	-0.062*** (0.021)
Number of Votes (log)	0.045 (0.051)	0.058 (0.054)	0.118 (0.161)	0.195 (0.168)
Celebrity	0.035 (0.105)	0.032 (0.107)	-1.24*** (0.408)	-1.23*** (0.410)
Significant Business Interests	-0.010 (0.035)	-0.020 (0.036)	-0.073 (0.237)	-0.091 (0.235)
Govt Bills (all)		0.036* (0.020)		0.110*** (0.040)
Absenteeism (all)		-0.003 (0.003)		0.003 (0.013)
Bills (ihs)		0.0005 (0.021)		0.118 (0.113)
Spot on PR Common List			4.30*** (0.539)	4.29*** (0.517)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.676	0.682	0.322	0.330
Observations	361	361	733	733
Oster's $\delta$ for $\beta = 0$	1.28	1.24	-4.12	-3.91
Convocation fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Occupation fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓


**Note:** \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1 This table shows results about the different channels of deputy accountability. Columns 1 and 2 analyze the outcome of whether a deputy was elected from a single-member district; the sample only includes those that ran. Columns 3 and 4 analyze the placement of each deputy on the party list, with lower numbers indicating a higher likelihood of receiving a seat in the Duma. All models are estimated using OLS with standard errors clustered at the deputy level.

**FIGURE F1: COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIP OF KOMPROMAT DEPUTIES**



**Note:** This figure plots mean number of more komproamat deputies by committee across the three convocations. Committee names reflect the main issue(s) around which the committee convenes since the exact titles and responsibilities can change over time.

**FIGURE F2: COMMITTEE LEADERSHIP OF KOMPROMAT DEPUTIES**



**Note:** This figure plots mean number of leadership positions held by kompromat deputies by committee across the three convocations. Committee names reflect the main issue(s) around which the committee convenes since the exact titles and responsibilities can change over time. Committee Leadership positions include Chair, First Deputy Chair, and Deputy Chair.

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